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           Abstract: 
 
The president and executive branch of the U.S government has found that it is often 
subject to other domestic factors influencing its foreign policy in the 21st century and 
post - Cold War era.  This is examined here by studying the case of NAFTA 
ratification and the proposal to expand NAFTA.  While according to the U.S. 
Constitution, the Congress also has a key role in the foreign policy making arena, the 
examples from NAFTA and NAFTA ratification indeed illustrate that the foreign 
policy process had a lot more domestic influence in the period between 1993 -1998.  
This of course is desirable in a democratic country.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
This study seeks to demonstrate that the role of public opinion in the making of 
American foreign policy increased in relevance in the second half of the 1990s through 
a case study of the American public’s reaction to the ratification and expansion of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between 1993 - 1998.  Evidence to 
support the public’s role in the NAFTA example can be gleaned from newspaper 
reports detailing mass rally’s and demonstrations against a range of perceived dangers.  
These were dangers such as competition where Mexico had an advantage due to the 
cheap labour and production costs found there.   While the protests and 
demonstrations were not to the extent that America had seen over its domestic policies 
during the civil right demonstrations of the 1960s, or those when American lives were 
being sacrificed in Vietnam, it did represent a new relevance for the involvement of the 
public on U.S. foreign policy issues.  For example, in one rally against NAFTA 
recorded in the Boston Globe, November 3rd 1993, it was noted that a group of more 
than two dozen trucks, vans and cars had set out from Charleston, North Carolina, 
plastered with anti-NAFTA slogans.  Their aim was to stage a noisy convoy and whip 
up opposition to the U.S. - Canada - Mexico free trade accord.  In order to help their 
anti-NAFTA campaign, at every stop the Charleston convoy offered members of the 
public free use of mobile phones to call their Congressmen and urge them to reject the 
NAFTA. 1 
1  This particular anti - NAFTA rally in Charleston was led by labour groups protesting against 
NAFTA being passed.  A lot of the vehicles and phones used and given out had been donated by 
labour unions, this was pointed out in  Mey Vailancourt, “Labour Rallies against NAFTA” Boston 
Globe, Nov 9th 1993. 
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This study thus seeks to provide evidence to support the assertion that the role of 
public opinion in the making of American foreign policy increased in relevance in the 
second half of the 1990s through a case study of the American public’s reaction to the 
expansion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between 1993 -
1998.   
 
After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the early years of 
the 1990s witnessed the U.S. foreign policy agenda entering a period featuring a 
number of issues from which it was difficult to make a case for excluding the public 
and its representatives.  This agenda included but was not limited to issues on which 
the public always has strong views.  In such cases the thesis that “the President knows 
best” appeared less appealing than for example during World War Two and the Cold 
War, when national security overrode the priority of other issues and demanded a 
bipartisan approach.  Now issues including trade and protectionism, refugees and 
immigration achieved a high public and controversial profile.   
 
These are the issues which appeared most frequently as the public’s most important 
foreign policy concerns.  Moreover, without a single overwhelming military threat to 
divert attention, economics increasingly came to dominate the foreign policy agenda. 2  
 
 
2 James M Scott, After the End, Duke University Press, 1998, 359. 
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For example, assessments conducted in 1990, and 1994 show that protecting U.S. jobs 
was either the first or second most cited foreign policy goal for the public.  Protecting 
U.S. business abroad has steadily risen as a policy goal as well : in 1986 it ranked 
tenth, while by 1994 it had emerged as the third most common foreign policy goal.  
These issues also tend to be resolved over a longer period of time, thus allowing more 
opportunities for the public, interest groups, the media, Congress and other domestic 
actors to play a significant role.   
 
In the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement which passed in 1993 and 
the proposed extension to NAFTA in 1997 a large swelling of opposition emerged 
within American domestic opinion.  This was especially due to the fear of cheaper 
products and production methods widely found in Mexico which could cause huge job 
losses, job relocations and factory closures in America.  Yet despite opposition, in the 
case of the 1993 NAFTA the benefits of increasing the free trade area and expanding 
markets led to the passage of the agreement.  In the case of the attempt to expand 
NAFTA just a few years later in 1997 however, the administration’s proposal  was not 
ratified by the Congress.  This change in public and congressional attitudes is therefore 
well placed to provide an analysis of whether domestic factors in the U.S. were more 
important in the period of the second half of the 1990s.  Yet for a lot of time 
commentators have doubted the influence and impact of domestic factors on American 
foreign policy.  For example, since writers on this topic such as Walter Lippmann in 
1922 and Gabriel Almond in the 1960s, 3 scholars have not questioned the desirability 
3 Walter Lippmann,  Public Opinion  Macmillan, 1922,  Gabriel Almond, The American People and 
Foreign Policy, Praeger, 2nd Ed. 1960. 
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for the public to have an impact on the policy of a country which is a democracy.  Yet, 
with progress towards more sophisticated techniques of measuring public attitudes and 
opinions through better survey techniques and more frequent polls being taken, the 
stability and changes in attitudes being measured allowed the issue to be considered 
more fully.  One prominent study by Bernard Cohen in 1973 took an in depth look at 
the impact and influence of public opinion on the U.S. State Department, and 
concluded that there was very little evidence for the public making an impact on this 
key foreign policy making department. 4  Yet, with the reversal of American foreign 
policy towards Vietnam, in light of huge protests at home, another phase of scholars 
illustrated how public opinion could make a huge impact on policy, and indeed how the 
primary emotional response of a public could sway foreign policy in a direction which 
was not derived from the expertise and knowledge which the foreign policy elite had 
and that the public at large did not.   
 
While some commentators still highlighted the dangers of a foreign policy which is 
heavily influenced by an emotional response, 5 most agree that policymakers have an 
understanding of the prevalent public attitudes and set their policy within the perceived 
acceptable limits. 6  In line with this contention, this study aims to provide some key 
4 Bernard Cohen, The Public’s Impact on Foreign Policy, Little Brown, 1973. 
5  This term an “emotional response” is often related to instances when the public have called for the 
U.S. military to take action to support peoples in trouble either from attack or famine, but then appear 
equally unwilling to tolerate the loss of American lives which such an action involves and then call 
for a policy change or reversal.  The term is most associated with Realist commentators.   
6 For example, scholars who have written a lot on this topic and those who agree with this contention 
are:  Eugene R Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism, Duke University Press, 1990, Ole R Holsti, Public 
Opinion and Foreign Policy, University of Michigan, 1996, John Mueller, Public Opinion in the Gulf 
War, University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
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evidence from the case of the NAFTA to illustrate how the foreign policy making 
environment of the late 1990s allowed for a plateau or platform where more domestic 
voices and public interest groups could make an impact on foreign policy.   
 
As mentioned at the outset, in the case of the NAFTA, there was disagreement within 
the government and the population as to whether a trade agreement would open 
markets and opportunities for America to increase its economic wealth, or whether 
American companies would relocate to areas of Mexico where they could produce 
their goods for a lower cost.  The main sources that will be used to investigate this 
issue in order to provide an accurate account are statistics on outputs of items like 
vegetables, sugar and cars, which were key goods produced in some key affected 
states, as well as official administration data about the way particular members of 
Congress voted, and what factors were likely to have influenced their votes.  As a 
result, it is the hope that by looking at the NAFTA case in some detail, this study can 
add to the existing scholarly research by giving a more detailed account of how 
government officials’ perceptions of public opinion can influence their decisions, and 
how other domestic groups can also have an impact.  In order to provide some 
understanding of the U.S. foreign policy environment in the late 1990s, before coming 
to the analysis of NAFTA, the opening chapters will explain the background and 
context.   
 
The following chapter discusses the general thesis of the  “new politics of American 
foreign policy,” which suggests an increased role for domestic factors in U.S. foreign 
policy and highlights some problems and issues concerning American foreign policy.  
This chapter will also outline a number of other key trends particular to the late 1990s 
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namely, the rise of “intermestic issues” and “global issues”.  Chapter three goes on to 
discuss and analyse the role of the media in American foreign policy.  This is a highly 
complex issue, but is of great importance, especially in light of technological advances 
in recent decades.  Chapter four will then outline the basis of the NAFTA and proposal 
for NAFTA extension which are then analysed in the subsequent three chapters.  This 
will enable us to understand the public’s reaction to the expansion of NAFTA between 
1993-1998 and will test the general hypothesis of the “new” early post- Cold War 
politics of U.S. foreign policy making. 
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2.  The New Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy: Accounting for an 
increased role of domestic factors in U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
 
This chapter illustrates the “new politics” of American foreign policy in the post-Cold 
War period, and demonstrates in particular how U.S. foreign policy in this period is 
distinct from the Cold War era with the notable exception of the up - surge of public 
opinion during the latter part of the Vietnam War.  The main focus is therefore to 
explain the “new politics” and changed nature of American foreign policy, and 
illustrate how domestic factors appeared to be increasingly affecting American foreign 
policies in the years immediately after the Cold War.  It also outlines some of the 
generic problems and issues that arise in U.S. foreign policy making.   
 
Problems and issues surrounding American foreign policy: 
On the whole, American foreign policy can be put into three categories; crisis, strategic 
and structural policy.  Crisis policy is the most visible though least common category 
of foreign policy, and can be defined as situations in which officials perceive an 
immediate threat to U.S. national interests and are actively considering whether to use 
military force.  The most obvious example of this is the workings of the EXCOM for 
President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Due to the inherent and 
institutional advantages of his office, presidential power is at a maximum in crisis 
situations.  That is not to say that Congress can never figure in crisis policy.  In fact, as 
the effort to cut off funding for Vietnam during the dying days of the war and the 
grumbling in late 1993 over the peacekeeping effort in Somalia, Congress may become 
active and act as a check on the executive branch once troops are deployed.   
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In this respect, Louis Fisher has argued that through its prerogative to authorize 
programmes and appropriate funds, Congress has the authority to withhold all or part 
of an appropriation and may attach riders to appropriations measures to proscribe 
certain actions. 7  Indeed, on several occasions in the past – 25 years, Congress has 
used its control of the purse strings to limit U.S. military involvement. Consider the 
following examples:  
 In 1973, Congress used the power of the purse to end the war in Vietnam.  
 That same year, the passage of the Eagleton Amendment compelled the Nixon 
administration to halt all U.S. military activities in Cambodia and Laos.  
 The Clark Amendment of 1975 barred the U.S. from aiding any military or 
paramilitary operations in Angola for nearly a decade and denied any 
appropriated funds to finance directly or indirectly any type of military 
assistance to Angola.  
 In a similar vein, Congress adopted the Boland Amendment in 1984 to prohibit 
assistance of any kind by the Reagan administration to support the Contras in 
Nicaragua. 8 Though at times such as in the Iran - Contra affair the executive 
can take measures to avoid these Congressional restrictions: it covertly funded 
the Contras in Nicaragua.   
 
Although crisis policy rivets the attentions of practitioners and scholars alike, far more 
foreign policy issues constitute strategic policy. At its most essential, strategic policy 
outlines the basic goals and tactics of foreign policy. Included in this category are the 
7 For a further discussion see Louis Fisher, The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and the Executive, 
2nd Ed, CQ Press, 1987. 
8 Ibid. 
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broad policy positions of U.S. relations with other countries, such as whether the U.S. 
will pressure China to improve its human rights record or encourage Israel to trade 
land for peace, the basic mix and missions of military forces such as whether nuclear 
strategy should emphasize defensive systems over offensive ones; and trade policy in 
general.  
 
In contrast to crisis policy, Congress exercises continuous influence upon strategic 
policy. Partly, due to the fact that challenging the president on strategic issues pose 
less threat to their electoral fortunes than on crisis policy, partly because of incentives 
offered by interest groups for members who champion their cause and also because 
many strategic decisions clearly require congressional assent.  
 
For example, two-thirds of the Senate must consent to any treaty. As President Carter 
discovered with both the Panama Canal and SALT 2 treaties, the ability of senators to 
withhold consent gives them leverage over strategic policy, which could affect his 
ability to get treaties passed easily.  In the case of SALT 2 their leverage prevented 
passage of the treaties, and though the Panama Canal treaty passed eventually 
Congressional leverage complicated the situation.   
 
Congress also has a powerful tool with which to influence strategic policy in its 
commerce power.  The Constitution specifically allocates power over foreign trade to 
the Congress.  The manner which the Executive Branch conducts trade talks is thus 
determined by the Congress when and if it delegates such powers to the Executive.  As 
we shall see this was important for NAFTA regarding what are known as “fast track” 
powers, of which more later.  Of course, trade agreements such as NAFTA must 
Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)
       12 
ultimately be approved by Congress, which gives the executive branch strong 
incentives to incorporate congressional views into the final agreement.  
 
Members of Congress can also initiate trade legislation to achieve political goals 
abroad, with the underlying assumption being that rewards or (more commonly) 
punishments will force other countries to alter their behaviour. For instance, in 1986, 
Congress overrode President Reagan’s veto and imposed trade sanctions on South 
Africa in an effort to pressure it into dismantling apartheid.9 
 
In the area of structural policy, congressional influence over foreign policy is at its 
greatest and presidential influence is at its weakest. Structural policy governs how 
American resources will be used to achieve foreign policy goals. As such it most 
closely resembles decision making on domestic distributive politics. Structural policy 
answers questions such as which countries will receive aid and how much money will 
be given to international organisations.  
 
Congress’s greater influence over the structural policy also stems from the fact that in 
structural policy the president’s inherent advantages, particularly the ability to initiate 
policy are often nullified. Most decisions on structural policy involve appropriations, 
and presidents cannot spend money that Congress refuses to appropriate. As a result, 
in structural policy the burden rests with the executive to persuade members to support 
its programmes.  
 
9 Ibid, 421. 
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The extent to which Congress influences structural policy is clear when it comes to 
foreign assistance where the record is not merely one of "congressional participation 
but, indeed, of Congressional dominance". Members of Congress use the power of the 
purse to stipulate how foreign aid can be spent. The 1988 foreign aid bill for example, 
earmarked specific spending levels for 92% of all military aid and, 98% of all economic 
aid, and 49% of all development aid leaving the executive branch with relatively little 
discretion in how to spend foreign aid. 10  
 
Though Congress does have a great deal of influence on foreign policy through 
legislation, focusing on substantive legislation misses a wide variety of other ways in 
which Congress influences policy indirectly.  
For example, Anticipated Reactions whereby the mood on Capitol Hill determines 
what policy options are politically feasible for the executive branch.  
 
Amendments may also influence the direction of policy, but are often used as a way of 
sending a signal to a particular group.  In addition, Congress can use procedural 
innovations to alter the structure and processes by which decisions are made in the 
executive branch. For example, in 1997, Congress created the Bureau of Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the State Department to ensure that greater 
emphasize would be given to human rights in the formulation of U.S. Foreign Policy. 11   
 
Framing opinion: by "going public" Congressmen can often get media and public 
10 Charles W Kegley Eugene R Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy,  St Martin‘s Press, 1995, 423. 
11 Louis Fisher, The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and the Executive, 2nd Ed, CQ Press, 1987, 
26. 
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attention and consequently attract executive branch attention.  In 1993, Congress 
established a deadline for troops to leave Somalia. No funds could be used for military 
action after 31st March 1994, unless the president requested an extension from 
Congress and received legislative authority. 12  Additionally, Congress also cut out 
funds in the mid-1990s to enforce the U.N arms embargo against Bosnia.  
 
As these examples suggest, Congress may become active and act as a check on the 
executive branch once troops are deployed, especially, if the policy is unpopular with 
the public or not seen to be in the national interest. Furthermore, members of Congress 
may succeed in shaping crisis decisions before the deployment of troops if a president 
chooses to solicit their views or request their authorisation.   
This analytical division of crisis, strategic, and structural gives a general over - view of 
the kinds of foreign policy made and how they are implemented, but specific time - 
dependent factors can have significant impact on them: for example, Cold War and 
post- Cold War circumstances.  Thus, during the period of American foreign policy in 
the late 1940s -1960s when the foreign policy consensus was strongest a different 
trend was apparent.  That is to say, when the U.S. was committed to an active 
responsibility in the direction of international affairs through interventionism and 
military might to wage the Cold War, there was a greater tendency towards executive 
branch (especially White House) leadership in the making of U.S. foreign policy.  For 
example, examining the legislative - executive relationship during the fifties and sixties, 
Aaron Wildavsky found that presidents were much more successful in influencing 
foreign policy legislation than they were in affecting the outcome of domestic 
12 D,A, Desse(Ed), The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, St Martin’s Press, 1994 18. 
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legislation. 13   
 
In order to highlight the president’s role in foreign affairs during the Cold War 
however, it is helpful to note some historical features of the role played by the 
executive and legislative branches of government.  Indeed, any study of  American 
foreign policy must begin by recognising that in this process the president is the most 
important actor and the executive is the most important branch of government.  By 
designating the President “Commander in Chief” of the Armed forces of the U.S., the 
Constitution creates the president’s central role.  Compared to Congress, he enjoys the 
inherent advantages of “decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch” identified by 
Alexander Hamilton more than 200 years ago. 14  Presidents also have added 
institutional leverage by using the veto, and by virtue of the partisan, regional and 
organisational divisions in Congress.  Furthermore, the constitutional, inherent and 
institutional advantages of the presidency have been reinforced from the combination 
of customs and tradition as well as judicial interpretations.  For example, in the early 
years of the American republic, George Washington robustly carried out his 
constitutionally granted rights to initiate the conduct of foreign policy, to represent the 
U.S. in its foreign relations, to negotiate international agreements and to extend 
political recognition to other states. 15  In a similar vein, the Supreme Court, by its 
rulings such as U.S. Curtis-Wright Export Corporation (1936), has repeatedly 
acquiesced to the robust exercise of broad powers by the president in foreign affairs at 
the expense of Congress.  It goes too far however to argue that the executive branch is 
13 James M Scott, After the End, Duke University Press, 1998, 13. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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the only actor that matters in foreign policy.  As the Constitutional division of powers 
suggest, Congress also matters.   
 
In fact, the powers granted to Congress in the Constitution are technically formidable.  
The Constitution authorises Congress to deal with the regulation of international 
commerce, to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, to 
provide for the common defence, and to declare wars.  Article 2, Section 2 specifies 
that the Senate must give its advice and consent to all treaties and ambassadorial 
appointments. 16  Furthermore, Congress’s power to appropriate funds from the 
treasury and to tax and spend for the common defence and the general welfare 
continually imprint on the conduct of foreign affairs.  Indeed, the first 150 years of the 
American republic provides ample evidence of a strong congressional role in the 
making of foreign policy.  For example, the “war hawks” in the House of 
Representatives played an instrumental role in pushing a reluctant James Madison into 
the War of 1812.  Congress’s role in foreign policy grew even more markedly after the 
Civil War, so much so that the later half of the nineteenth century has been called an 
era of “congressional government” and “congressional supremacy”.   
 
At that time, Congress’s say on foreign policy was exercised primarily through the 
Senate’s treaty - making power.  For example, no major treaty passed the Senate 
between 1871-1898, which surely must have frustrated the administrations of the day. 
16 James M Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of American Foreign Policy, Baltimore, John Hopkins 
University, 1994 15. 
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17  Similarly, in the early twentieth century, the failure of the Senate to ratify the Treaty 
of Versailles was a fatal blow to President Wilson.  Franklin Roosevelt, as well, faced a 
series of neutrality acts that kept him from pursuing the policies he favoured in Europe, 
during the years immediately before World War Two and between the outbreak of war 
and the U.S. entry in December 1941.   
 
Yet, beginning in the early 1950s, members of Congress increasingly came to define 
their role in foreign policy as one of deferring to the wishes of the President.  Now in 
Cold War, as had been the case in the “hot” war, bipartisan support of the 
government’s foreign policy in a time of national crisis was seen to be patriotically 
required.  This is not to say that Congress slavishly followed the lead of the White 
House throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  For example, there were heated debates over 
the fall of nationalist China, the Bricker Amendment and the missile gap.  The Bricker 
Amendment for example was a series of proposed amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution which were considered by the U.S. Senate in the 1950s and voted on in 
1953.  It was proposed by Senator Bricker of Ohio and was intended to restrict the 
scope of  treaties that the U.S. entered into with other nations and trans-national 
agencies.  Yet, despite some debate on this issue the intervention of President 
Eisenhower led to it being blocked.18 This illustrates that while Congress was involved 
on foreign policy to the extent that it debated issues in the House and Senate, it very 
much played a less defining role than the executive branch.  Thus, much congressional 
activity on foreign policy only addressed marginal issues.   
17 Randall B Ripley James M Lindsay, (Eds) Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defence Policy on 
Capitol Hill, Univ. of Michigan Press, 1993, 4. 
18 www.wikipedia.org/Bricker_Amendment 
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Even rarer still were attempts to challenge the president’s overall authority in foreign 
affairs or to demand a decisive say for Congress.  Nowhere was the decline of 
congressional influence more visible than in the case of the war power.  For example, 
between 1955-1965 Congress passed “area resolutions” granting presidents broad 
authority to deal with conflict in the Middle East, Berlin, Cuba, the China straits and 
Vietnam as they alone saw fit.  Thus, for the most part of the 1950s and 1960s, 
members of Congress were content merely to legitimate decisions made by the White 
House. 19  
 
The era of Congressional deference came to a crashing halt however, with the souring 
of opinion on the Vietnam War.  As the prospects for victory in Vietnam became 
dimmer and dimmer, and as it became increasingly clear that successive administrations 
had misled Congress and the American public on key points about U.S. involvement in 
Southeast Asia more questions were raised about the administration’s policies.  
Suddenly there was disagreement not only over what threats faced the U.S., but also 
over whether giving the executive branch most authority in these matters was wise.  
With the ends and means of foreign policy once again legitimate topics for debate, a 
19 James M Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of American Foreign Policy, Baltimore, John Hopkins 
University, 1994Lindsay, 24.  Moreover, a leading scholar, Arthur Schlesinger Jr has argued that this 
eventually led to presidents acquiring powers beyond the limits of the Constitution.  According to 
Schlesinger, the daily accountability of the President to the Congress, the courts, the press and the 
people has been replaced by an accountability of once every four years during an election.  These 
changes occurred slowly over the centuries so that which appears normal differs from what was the 
original state of America. Arthur M Schlesinger Jr, “The Imperial Presidency,”  Houghton Mifflin 
Company 1973, http://books.google.co.uk/books.id=the+imperial+presidency 
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resurgence of congressional activism was inevitable.  Indeed, beginning in the 1970s, 
Congress started to reassert its authority on foreign policy with the passing of 
legislation such as the War Powers Resolution and the Hughes - Ryan amendment 
which sought to curtail the dominance of the presidency. 20  
  
However, Cold War and thus national security priorities still made Congress reluctant 
to challenge the President unless there was a specific high profile issue such as the high 
body count in Vietnam or suggestions of wrong - doing as in the Iran - Contra affair.  
With the end of the Cold War restraints on Congress weakened.  At this point, new 
circumstances arose to affect the model of foreign policy decision - making : crisis, 
strategic and structural.  Three examples noted by Ripley and Lindsay illustrate the 
more involved congressional role in foreign policy that now developed.  First, on 
November 4th 1991, the Wall St Journal reported that “struggling to define the 
Pentagon’s role in a rapidly changing world, House and Senate negotiators hammered 
out a $291 billion defence bill that rejects many of President Bush’s long - standing 
military assumptions”. 21  The strategic disagreement between Congress and President 
resulted in a halt to the acquisition of more B-2 Stealth bombers, cuts in research and 
20 Of all the issues in foreign policy, none better illustrates the transition from bipartisan deference to 
the president to Congressional assertiveness that the annual authorisation bills.  From 1961-1968, 
only once were there more than fifteen votes against final passage.  By comparison, in 1986, conflict 
over defence authorisation was much more widespread, and members of Congress launched a full - 
scale assault on Reagan’s defence policies.  Foe example, five significant amendments that changed 
various specific policies were adopted, and the House passed an additional amendment that reduced 
spending 11% below Reagan’s proposed budget.  David W Rodhe, “Partisan Leadership and 
Congressional Assertiveness in Foreign and Defence Policy” in D,A, Desse (Ed) The NewPolitics of 
American Foreign Policy, St Martin’s Press, 1994, 90-91.  After the end of the Cold War, Congress 
became even more assertive.   
21 Wall St Journal, 4th November 1991. 
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development on a space - based missile - defence system and the provision of funds to 
maintain the F-117 Stealth fighter and the V-22 Osprey aircraft programs. 22  The 
president set the agenda debated in Congress but the final outcome bore clear 
congressional imprints.   
 
Second, in late 1991, Congressman Les Aspin (Democrat-Wisconsin) and Senator Sam 
Nunn (Democrat-Georgia) proposed taking $1 billion from the defence budget to 
provide economic aid to the former Soviet Union.  The effort initially collapsed when 
the White House shied away from the plan as part of its response to the politically 
telling charge that the president was paying too much attention to foreign affairs and 
not enough to domestic matters.  Concerned that America’s national security interests 
were being jeopardised by the vagaries of domestic politics, a bipartisan group of 
senators succeed, in late November, in securing passage of a plan to provide $500 
million in aid.  Then in January 1992, President Bush threw his support behind the idea 
of assisting the former Soviet republics and proposed an additional $645 million in aid. 
23   
 
Thirdly, in January 1992, the government and rebels in El Salvador signed a peace 
treaty ending more than a decade of civil war.  Congress played a pivotal role in 
making the treaty possible.  Over the objections of the Bush administration, Congress 
in 1990 slashed U.S. military aid to El Salvador with the choice of negotiating with the 
rebels or losing U.S. aid.  The government chose to negotiate.  At the same time, 
22 Randall B Ripley James M Lindsay, (Eds) Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defence Policy on 
Capitol Hill, Univ. of Michigan Press, 1993, 5. 
23 Ibid. 
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Congressman Joseph Moakley (D-Mass) the chair of the House Rules Committee and 
a leader in the fight to terminate aid to El Salvador, helped to convince rebel leaders to 
take the peace talks seriously.  In June 1991, Moakley and U.S. Ambassador William 
Walker met with rebel leaders inside rebel held territory.  Rebel leaders later told U.S. 
officials that Moakley’s trip marked the turning point in their approach to the peace 
talks. 24  
 
Yet there remains a number of roles for the White House that continue to place the 
President in a key position even if he is more challenged by Congress.  As J.M Scott 
points out for example, the White House play a vital role in foreign policy agenda - 
setting, that is: the process of identifying problems, setting priorities and so on. 25  
 
A second principal element of presidential influence in the post - cold war world as 
well as in other periods, stems from the ability to initiate action, a function of the chief 
executive, chief diplomat and commander in chief, all roles assigned to the president.  
Although it is closely related to the agenda - setting power possessed by the White 
House, this capability to take action gives the White House the ability to force other 
actors in the policy making process to respond.  However, as Rosati and Twing 
explain, while the President has numerous opportunities and advantages in the foreign 
policy making arena there are also important constraints.  For instance, the factors 
mentioned earlier, such as Congress’s reassertion of activism on foreign policy, new 
problems and issues in the post-Cold War world and the increasing importance of 
24 C Madison,  “At last  peace in El Salvador,” National Journal 24: p185. 
25 James M Scott, After the End, Duke University Press, 1998, 392. 
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interdependence, globalism and economic issues, has led to a more widely diffused 
involvement of actors on foreign policy.  This includes involvement by bureaucratic 
agencies, members of Congress, non -governmental actors, interest groups and the 
public.   
 
Turning then to the issue of the public, public opinion’s influence on foreign policy is 
well illustrated on questions over the use of force. Public opinion towards the use of 
U.S. troops abroad, particularly when it is largely formed and articulated by the visual 
media can often quickly change. For example, in the three cases where the U.N. has 
used force to protect innocent victims of civil conflict (the creation of safe havens for 
the Iraqi Kurds; in Somalia; and in the former Yugolslavia), the American public has 
generally forced its often reluctant government to support international intervention. 
But it is also public opinion and the media’s coverage of returning body bags which has 
prompted U.S. politicians to limit their involvement.  
 
Yet, without a single, overwhelming military threat to divert attention, economics 
increasingly headed the foreign policy agenda after the end of the Cold War and prior 
to 9/11. For example, assessments conducted in 1986, 1990 and 1994 show that 
protecting U.S. jobs was either the first or second most cited foreign policy goal for 
the public. Protecting U.S. business abroad has steadily risen as a policy goal as well: 
in 1986 it ranked tenth while by 1994 in had emerged as the third most common 
foreign policy goal.  It is within this context that changes in the domestic and 
international environment occurred and discussing them below will help the reader 
understand the unique situation of American foreign policy in the 1990s.   
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Changes in the international environment: 
Throughout the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was based on the three principles of 
globalism, anti-communism and containment. The U.S. committed itself to an active 
responsibility in the direction of international affairs, and used interventionism, military 
might and nuclear deterrence to combat the spread of communism and contain Soviet 
expansionism and influence, which in Washington eyes represented a supremely 
dangerous threat.  
 
The end of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union robbed the U.S. of more than 
an enemy, it deprived Washington of a clearly defined role and of a coherent 
conceptual framework for approaching foreign policy in the 1990’s.  In fact there was 
a large amount of debate among scholars at the end of the Cold War about which 
strategy or doctrine would be most appropriate for the U.S. in this new era.  For 
example, some experts such as Michael Doyle and Francis Fukuyama spoke of a peace 
dividend, where liberal democracies had emerged as the best government system in the 
Cold War and could look forward to a relatively peaceful existence among democratic 
nations. 26 Other strategists such as Henry Kissinger were not as quick to dismiss 
struggle and conflict and spoke of an international system where geopolitics would be 
at the forefront, with a more multi-polar structure where economic and military power 
were more diffuse. 27  For others such as Samuel P Huntington, the new era would 
rather be best defined as a system with deepening divisions among the many different 
cultural zones - such as Muslim, Hindu, Confucian and Western, and thus raised the 
26 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press, 1992, and Michael W 
Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, W, W, Norton and Co, 1997. 
27 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, Simon and Schluster 1994. 
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risk of a “clash of civilisations” 28  While scholars like Robert D Kaplan and Jessica T 
Mathews feared the new era would bring more weapons of mass destruction and 
environmental disasters and demographic changes that could bring famines and mass 
migrations. 29  These different potential futures all held merits but none emerged to 
dominate U.S. strategic thinking and to have such a strong policy guide as the previous 
containment strategy had had.   
 
Indeed, throughout the Cold War, American leadership was founded on a 
comprehensive power base that was unmatched by any other single power, including 
the USSR. Its seemingly boundless economic capabilities, and nuclear and 
conventional military power, gave the U.S. a capacity for global intervention that was 
both unprecedented and unsurpassed. Ironically though, American influence depended 
not only on American capabilities, but also on Soviet capabilities; the more the USSR 
tried to equal or exceed the military strength of the U.S., the more it frightened other 
states, making them even more reliant on Washington for protection, and reluctant to 
do anything that might encourage U.S. disengagement or abandonment. This inhibited 
challenges to American policy preferences. Although, this is not meant to suggest that 
allies such as France were acquiescent or that alliances were always harmonious. It is 
simply to argue that as a result there were limits to dissent and ultimate dependence on 
the U.S. gave Washington a considerable reservoir of influence over allies and clients.  
 
28 Samuel P Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations,  Simon and Schluster 1992. 
29 For these viewpoints see Robert D Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy and the Nation-State Under Seige 
, U.S. Institute of Peace, 1995.  
Jessica T Mathews , “Redefining Security” Foreign Affairs 68 Spring 1989. 
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That reservoir has been seriously depleted by the demise of the USSR. Military power 
that was used to protect against the enemy rather than for the coercion of allies cannot 
easily retain its relevance when there is no longer a need for protection. Although the 
U.S. may have residual influence because of the reluctance of some allies to break the 
psychological habit of dependence that developed during the Cold War. This is a 
rapidly declining asset, and perhaps most obvious in relation to Germany. For example, 
with the end of the Cold War and subsequent unification, Germany has engaged in 
security co-operation with France to a degree that was inconceivable when Bonn was 
concerned about Washington’s reactions to exclusively European security initiatives.  
 
The end of the Cold War also ushered in a period of prolonged transition toward an 
unknown destination. Whereas the Cold War created stability in the world’s division 
into two hostile blocs, and contained many conflicts because of their potential for 
spreading to additional countries or escalating to superpower confrontation, the end of 
the Cold War has seen the world become less stable, less predictable, and more violent 
as ethnic and tribal clashes which the Cold War suppressed have consequently been 
brought to the surface. In any case, it has become more difficult for the U.S. or any 
other country to control events. And instead of using force the U.S. is reliant more on 
bargaining, persuasion and multilateral institutions in order to get other countries to do 
what it wants them to do.  
 
Instead of one overriding east-west conflict, the order in the early post-Cold War era 
was based on mixed interests where countries found themselves allied on some issues 
and opposed on others. For example, the U.S and Russia have a mutual interest in 
preserving the military balance in Europe. Moreover, U.S. foreign policy has been 
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conducted generally on a short term basis due to the immediacy of foreign policy crises 
such as Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan, and being more subject to the influence 
of domestic politics.  America, in short has been unable  to develop and plan a long-
term foreign policy, in the post-Cold War era.  The U.S. had not only lost a role as a 
superpower leader and protector, and a considerable amount of influence that went 
with the role, but also lacked a framework of widely accepted judgements and 
assumptions to guide its policy in the 1990s. 30  
 
Changes in the domestic political environment: 
It was not the only the world that had changed. It was also the foreign policy process 
in the U.S. itself. This brings us to the second set of reasons why foreign policy has 
become more political, namely, changes in the U.S. domestic political environment. 
The overall picture is one of an erosion of consensus, a fragmentation of responsibility, 
and a competition for influence. The result, is a more open and political, but 
consequently less manageable foreign policy process. 
 
The three main changes in the domestic political environment to be illustrated here as 
having changed the U.S. foreign policy environment are the erosion of the consensus 
which had previously glued American opinion together for the pursuit of its foreign 
policy aims, the rise of intermestic issues and changes in the international environment, 
that have impact with the U.S.A. 
 
30 See for example in Charles W Kegley Eugene R Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, St Martin’s 
Press,  5th Ed, 1995, chapter 2. 
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From the early 1950s to the mid - 1970s, a widespread domestic consensus on foreign 
policy existed in America, whereby the executive branch, Congress , and the public 
overwhemingly agreed that the U.S. and its allies faced a grave threat from hostile 
expansionist states and that U.S. interests would be best served if the president had a 
maximum discretion in foreign affairs, For example, Wittkopf and others have 
suggested that around 80% of the public constantly agreed with Cold War foreign 
policy based on anti-communism and the Congress generally delegated authority to the 
president in this early Cold War period.  
 
However, as the prospects for victory in Vietnam became dimmer and dimmer, and as 
it became increasingly clear that the successive administrations had misled Congress 
and the American public on key points about U.S. involvement in South east Asia – 
along with revelations of executive branch abuse of power – such as Watergate, the 
domestic foreign policy consensus broke down. Suddenly there was disagreement not 
only over what threats faced the U.S. but also over whether giving the executive 
branch most authority in these matters was wise.  
 
Consequently, foreign policy became subject to increased partisan debate, with 
domestic actors such as the media, the Congress, interest groups and the public 
seeking to influence and have a say in the direction of foreign policy.  Thus, challenges 
to executive branch authority became more frequent and the executive cannot pursue a 
foreign policy without domestic support. 31 At the same time however, Cold War 
31 See chapter by John T Tierney, “Congressional Activism in Foreign Policy: Its Varied Forms and 
Stimuli” in D A Desse, (Ed) The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, St Martin’s 1994. 
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national security priorities still acted as powerful constraints on both congressmen and 
on the public in general.  Without specific issues such as the death toll in Vietnam or 
the wrong-doings in the Iran - Contra Affair, there was still a very strong tendency to 
defer to the President on foreign policy issues.  That tendency diminished distinctly 
once the Cold War ended.   
 
In the environment of the 1970s and 1980s when the West was submerged in economic 
crises, more and more people across America were affected by, and began to protest 
against, the increasing vulnerabilty to international economic and political forces such 
as high oil prices and Japanese imports. This also contributed to foreign policy 
becoming more "domesticated". As Paarlberg, observed "policymakers began to talk 
about "intermestic" affairs, those issues (such as trade, finance and pollution, energy, 
terrorism, human rights and drug trafficking) which overlapped the foreign and 
domestic boundaries. 32 
 
Foreign policy making too, took on a more open and democratic character as the 
policymaking arena expanded to embrace the political and economic interests of a 
diverse range of domestic constituencies and groups whom these "intermestic" issues 
affected.  
 
For example, the amount and range of interest groups greatly expanded, as has 
32 Paarlberg was referred to in Thomas G Weiss Davis P Forsythe Rodger A Coate, The United 
Nations and Changing World Politics, Westview Press, 1994, 286.but also see Ryan J Barilleaux “The 
President, Intermestic Issues and the Risks of Policy Leadership” Presdidential Studies Quarterly, 
1985.  
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Congressional action on behalf of both interest groups and constituents, on such 
intermestic issues.  
 
As changes in the international system highlighted above have illustrated, following the 
end of the Cold War, the U.S. lacked what James Schlesinger described as " the 
magnetic north for calibrating its foreign policy," and seemed to be hopping from issue 
to issue without a clear sense of direction.  
 
This placed foreign policy more at the mercy of domestic politics: with Congressional 
sentiment, the public mood, the sensationalism of the media, and interest groups 
becoming more intrusive than ever before. 
 
Moreover, with the basic threat of America’s post-war containment strategy becoming 
largely redundant, in the 1990s the U.S. was confronted by powerful domestic 
pressures to restructure its foreign policy in order to devote more resources to 
domestic programmes and problems. Thus, in post-Cold War era, foreign policy is very 
different from before.  
 
The changes leading to an increased role of domestic actors can be illustrated by 
considering the part played by the Congress. In marked contrast to the deference 
Capitol Hill frequently accorded presidents in the 1950s and 1960s, Congress in the 
1990s involved itself in a dizzying array of foreign policy issues. Some sense of the 
extent of Congressional activism can be gleaned from a simple statistic about 
legislation on foreign policy. Whereas the 1960 edition of "Legislation on Foreign 
Relations" ran to 519 pages, the 1990 edition ran to 5438 pages and spanned 4 
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volumes. 33  Furthermore, in his work on the restructuring of Los Angeles in the post - 
Cold War era, Michael Oden highlighted some of the local consequences that the shift 
from competition with the former Soviet Union meant for the city of Los Angeles.  In 
one instance for example, Los Angeles had been home to the largest aerospace and 
electronics complexes in the world from the 1940s until the mid-1990s, and for the 
city, this meant that hundreds of thousands of its residents had jobs in industries 
producing bombs, missiles or surveillance satellites.  Indeed, large companies like 
McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed and Rockwell all had their headquarters in the city.  
While these industries were not portrayed in the popular “Hollywood“ and “movie-
making capital” which Los Angeles is famous for, the Cold War did play a huge part in 
providing a lot of industries and jobs in the city.  As is to be expected then, from the 
late 1980s, Los Angeles experienced a huge economic reversal with the decline and 
closure of many of these industries.  Indeed, some figures provided from Oden 
illustrate this trend with 45000 or 47% of aircraft manufacturing jobs being lost 
between 1988 and 1996, and around 41000 or 69% in missile and space vehicle 
production. 34  Among other things, it was these kinds of economic consequences of 
the end of the Cold War that raised issues from the traditional domestic domain into 
the foreign policy domain.  They did so because of the fear of foreign competition 
causing even further job losses.   
 
The end of the Cold War eased world tensions, diminished the importance of foreign 
33 James M Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of American Foreign Policy, Baltimore, John Hopkins 
University, 1994, 19. 
34 Michael Oden, “When the movie’s over: the post - cold war restructuring of Los Angeles” in Jeffrey 
Engel, Local Consequences of the Cold War, Stanford U P 2008, 130. 
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policy crisis management and injected a renewed political partisanship into the making 
of foreign policy making.  In both categories of strategic and structural policy - making 
the voices of members of Congress, interest groups, corporations, the media and the 
public spoke more loudly.  As they did so intermestic issues came to more prominence, 
particularly driven by economic concerns about global competitiveness and domestic 
economic disruptions caused by the down-sizing of the military industrial complex, for 
example, in Southern California.   
 
All of this highlighted the massive change the end of the Cold War meant for many 
areas in the United States and how economic well - being then emerged as a key 
priority for the public and government alike.  In fact, while it is not the contention here 
that the public was not important in affecting government officials foreign policy 
decisions before the end of the Cold War; it is a contention that we can see more 
evidence of public and domestic groups affecting a greater variety of issues in the 
foreign policy domain which were important to them.  That is to say for example, while 
it has been clear that the American public got involved by demonstrating their support 
or protest over the Vietnam War, there are a greater number of issues that they are 
concerned about in the period of the late 1990s, due to the end of the Cold War and 
the rise of issues such as those mentioned above. 
 
This study aims to test the general hypothesis that the influence of public opinion and 
other internal factors in America has increased in the post-Cold War U.S. foreign 
policy environment, through a case study of the American public’s reaction to the 
expansion NAFTA between 1993 – 1998.  It is within this context that the issue of 
NAFTA became a passionate and highly debated issue in the U.S., and one in which 
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the previous trends of domestic activism on foreign policy seem to be less applicable.  
Indeed, as the later analysis in this work will illustrate, domestic actors and opinion 
were much more important and influential than they had been in the Cold War years.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  The role of the American Media in U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
 
Following on from the analysis in the previous chapter, illustrating the increasing 
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impact of domestic politics on foreign policy since the end of the Vietnam War and 
even more since the end of the Cold War, this chapter sets out to show how the media, 
( focusing primarily on television news and print media), is an influential factor in the 
way it operates in the foreign policy domain.  In line with the argument here that the 
public and Congressional opinion have an impact on U.S. policymakers and 
increasingly so since the end of the Cold War, we now need to assess whether they 
actually determine foreign policy.  This chapter aims to investigate what role the media 
plays in this realm.  Accordingly, the aim here is to investigate the media’s role and to 
determine the possible implications for the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement.   
 
Commentators, most notably Realists such as Kissinger and Kennan have raised 
concerns about the modern media and particularly the overwhelming ability of 
television news to pull the U.S. Government in and out of particular actions.  This is 
often seen in regard to media images such as those of dead American servicemen 
returning home which can arouse the public to make calls for policy changes.  This 
chapter will illustrate how such a line of argument vastly overstates the media’s actual 
influence as the government does not just follow media stories.  Instead, what will 
emerge is that the role of the media is a complex factor which affects the process of 
policy making more than actual policy though it does have a variety of roles and 
potential areas of influence.  For example, media may have the power to set the foreign 
policy agenda, and bring the public’s views to the government’s attention, this 
however falls far short of having the power to make foreign policy decisions.  In fact, 
the following discussion will show, government decisions are not taken without 
consideration of domestic opinion, Congressional opinion or without considering how 
the proposed action will play out in the media.  This however, does not mean that they 
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determine  policies and this is so even though the following discussion will also 
attempt to illustrate how the role of the media has been enhanced due to the nature of 
the post- Cold War era, as well as discussing the most prominent effects of such 
developments.  Here it will be argued that the media have changed the process of 
policy-making, but have not, as Realists contend, acquired the ability to determine 
policy.  As Ted Koppel the anchor and managing editor of Nightline on ABC News has 
noted, “We in the media do not focus on the national interest but on what interests the 
nation.  It is the policy-makers who must keep the national interest clear”. 35 
 
In order to illustrate these points, this chapter will cover four areas of discussion, with 
the following purposes.  The first area will consider the concerns of Realists who 
highlight the necessity of expertise, clarity, power and national interest rather than 
public emotion affecting foreign policy.  The second area will discuss changes in the 
post-Cold War period and their consequent effect on today’s media.  The third area 
analyses the role played by the U.S. Media in the 1990s, illustrating how it does not 
seem to hold as much influence as Realists contend, as well as how it affects the 
process of policy-making more than actual policy outcomes.  The final section will 
discuss the role of the media, as it pertains to the NAFTA agreement. 
 
 
Realists and the CNN effect: 
Writing in his diary on the day American troops landed on the camera - clogged 
beaches of Somalia, George Kennan wondered what explained this sudden and, for him 
35  Charles W Kegley Eugene R Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, St Martin’s Press,  5th Ed, 1995, 
294. 
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troubling undertaking.  Equally perplexing was the easy acceptance of the mission by 
Congress and the public with practically no “preparation”, as Kennan put it.  He 
concluded that the news media, particularly television offered the best explanation. 36   
There can be no question that the reason for this acceptance lies primarily with the 
exposure of the Somalia situation by the American media, above all, television.  The 
reaction would have been unthinkable without this exposure.  The reaction was an 
emotional one occasioned by the sight of the suffering of the starving people in 
question. 37   
 
Similarly, in the case of the debate over the NAFTA treaty ratification the U.S. public 
reacted with strong emotions to media coverage that highlighted the substantial 
consequences in terms of job loses.  Consider for example, the frequent references and 
coverage given by the media to Ross Perot and his warnings about NAFTA, such as 
the “giant sucking sound” he said would result as U.S. jobs headed south to Mexico in 
the wake of a NAFTA ratification.  Similarly, at rallies led by Perot against NAFTA, he 
told crowds “if NAFTA’s passed I’ll move to Mexico cause that’s where all the money 
will be”. 38  Yet as a poll cited by the Detroit Free Press in  August 1993 showed, 
while 65% of Americans opposed the NAFTA treaty, nearly half of Americans were 
unaware of the treaty’s basic provisions and goals. 39  Thus, with easy to remember 
media cues such as Perot’s “giant sucking sound”, many citizens seem to have reacted 
36  George Kennan, “If T.V. drives foreign policy, we‘re in trouble” New York Times, October 1993. 
37  George Kennan, “Somalia through a dark glass” New York Times, September 1993. 
38  Charlyne Berens, Amplyfying the Giant Sucking Sound,: Ross Perot and the Media in NAFTA 
negotiations, Newspaper Research Journal, Gale Group, 22nd March 1999, 4. 
39 Ibid, 5. 
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emotionally to the NAFTA proposal without even understanding on what it was based.   
 
American involvement in these cases was an example of what has come to be known as 
the CNN effect.  The “CNN effect” according to expert on government and media 
relations, Professor Livingston, can be in some instances, an acceleration of policy.  In 
other instances, it is a dialogue between warring parties. 40  In short, whereas in the 
past a president had days in which to weigh a response to a foreign crisis, today a 
stirring T.V. image can create a demand for an instantaneous reply.  As the former 
chief diplomatic correspondent for CBS and ABC, Marvin Kalb also pointed out in a 
speech delivered at Harvard University :  “Time was always a natural ally of politicians 
or the president, as time meant there was a moment to reflect.”  Now with the “CNN 
effect” issues can appear in a matter of instant seconds.  It is there.  The world today is 
a wired world, everything is connected, and there is an obligation on the part of people 
to respond. 41  Put another way, as Dan Rather, a reporter with over 40 years 
experience pointed out during an interview: “whereas previously it was commonplace 
for White House reporters to be told by the President’s press secretary “that’s all for 
today fellows, go on home””.  This kind of remark just does not happen with the 
advent of 24 hour news cycles. 42 
 
By comparison, foreign policy analysts, particularly those who espouse the dominant 
post - World War Two Realist approach attempt to minimise the role of emotion and 
moralism in the formulation of policy, stressing instead the role of expertise, 
40  The “CNN Effect” :TV and Foreign Policy, Transcript, pronounced May 7 1995, CNN.com, p,2 
41  ibid, p,2 
42  CNN interview with Anchorman Dan Rather, 3rd February 2006, Transcript at CNN.com. 
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rationality, and dispassionate analysis of international affairs, all in the pursuit of 
national interests defined in terms of power. Yet, for a variety of technological and 
commercial reasons, contemporary journalism places a premium on dramatic, breaking 
stories. Foreign affairs coverage in particular tends to highlight the sort of profound 
human suffering found in wars, famine and natural disasters. Some argue that even 
print journalism is now more disposed to this sort of coverage, modifying its content 
and style to "intensify emotional and on-the-spot depiction’s, at times at the expense of 
analysis". "If it bleeds, it leads".  43 
In addition, most journalists recognise several factors that define what is news. As 
Doris Graber notes, proximity, timeliness and prominence are frequently mentioned. 44   
Proximity means the closer a story is to readers in geographical space or personal 
impact, the more likely it is to be covered. Timeliness concerns an issues’ current 
relevance. While prominence refers to the presence of prominent people in potential 
stories, that is, the more prominent the actor, the more likely it is they will appear in 
the news. 45  For most of the mass media, one other factor also influences what is 
news: whether a situation involves conflict. 46  Indeed, the media of the late 20th and 
early 21st century frequently focus on conflict; controversy and the strategy of those 
involved in conflict.  
With selection criteria of this sort, Realist argue, news content cannot serve as a basis 
for a well-conceived foreign policy, for news stories are "fleeting, disjointed glimpses 
43  Steven Livingston Todd Eachus, “Humanitarian Crises and  U.S. Foreign Policy: Somalia and 
CNN effect Reconsidered, Political Communications 12  1995, 414. 
44 Doris Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993, 116. 
45  Ibid. 
46  CNN interview with  Anchorman Ted Koppel, 3rd February 2006. 
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of reality." Flickering on and off the screen, here today and gone tomorrow. 47   
 
Policy formulated in the faint blue glow of the television becomes a never-ending chase 
of media-induced challenge and response. Effective crisis management is rewarded, 
while time for careful analysis and reflection is lost. For example, historian Michael 
Beschloss has argued that because of television, modern policy-makers are no longer 
afforded the luxury of careful policy deliberation, such as the two weeks the Kennedy 
administration had during the Cuban Missile Crisis. 48  The results suggested 
Beschloss, could be catastrophic. In this view, real-time media serve as catalysts, 
accelerating policy-making time to dangerously short and reckless intervals. 
Furthermore, in the view of some, the end of the Cold War has exacerbated this 
tendency. With a multitude of trouble spots and new transnational issues competing for 
the attention and resources of the public and policy-makers alike, the country is 
without a clear guiding principle. As James Schlesinger has remarked: "In the absence 
of established guideposts our policies will be determined by impulse and image. In this 
age image means television, and policies seem increasingly subject, especially in 
democracies, to the images flickering across the television screen". 49   
 
Conversely, the CNN effect has been seen as an impediment to good policy 
implementation, in that it does not allow adequate time for consultation and 
47  George Kennan, “If T.V. drives foreign policy, we‘re in trouble” New York Times, October 1993, 
6. 
48  see Michael Beschloss, Presidents, Televsion, and Foreign Crisis, Washington D.C. 1993. 
49 In Steven Livingston Todd Eachus, "Humanitarian Crises and U.S. Foreign Policy: Somalia and 
CNN Effect Reconsidered, Political Communications 12, 1995. 
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consideration.  For example, when Soviet nuclear missiles were shipped to Cuba in 
October 1962, President Kennedy and his advisers deliberated for two weeks about 
how to respond, and Secretary McNamara did not turn on his television once. 50  In 
fact, it is often suggested that because of the nature of the instantaneous global media, 
with satellite imagery being made available to television networks, that if the Cuban 
Missile crisis had occurred today the president would be forced to respond with a 24 
hour news cycle or less to deflect allegations of not exercising his discretion correctly 
in meeting the challenge from the Soviet Union.  This, according to a suggestion by 
Admiral Jack Shanahan, director of the Centre for Defence Information could have led 
to nuclear war. 51  On the other hand, the glare of today’s media spotlight might have 
focused attention on the problem before it reached crisis proportions, leading to an 
earlier diplomatic solution.   
 
Effects of the end of the Cold War and advances in technology on the 
media today: 
By contrast with the post – Cold War era, for journalists, the Cold War had all the 
elements of a great story. It had tension, conflict and immediacy – the fear of nuclear 
Armageddon. It had good hard facts, such as defence budget numbers, Soviet weapons 
specifications and superpower arms control measures. Moreover, for over forty years, 
it played out in new ways nearly every day, from summit meetings to proxy wars from 
Afghanistan to El Salvador. By its very nature, the Cold War had powerful effects on 
the relationship between U.S. foreign policy-makers, Congress, the news media and the 
50  CNN Transcript Article “The CNN effect” CNN.com, 17th  May  1995,3. 
51  Ibid, 1. 
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American public, as for reasons of national security, these institutions largely deferred 
to the president in setting their agendas on foreign affairs. Similar to the actions of 
other domestic players during the Cold War, media criticism focused on government 
tactics rather than policy goals.  
 
From the late 1960’s however, the media’s power increased. Like the increasing 
importance of other domestic factors, (noted earlier), this can be attributed to the 
crumbling consensus about the world interests of the United States. For example, the 
outbreak of more frequent elite debates and congressional opposition to presidential 
foreign policy initiatives provided journalists with reportable opposition views. In a 
similar manner, the rise of a broader range of American foreign policy issues, such as, 
trade, environment, and human rights, gave more groups of people an interest in 
foreign policy.  
 
Thus, the end of the Cold War freed the U.S. news media to a significant extent from 
the agenda of the White House and the State Department, allowing reporters editors 
and producers to pursue stories more unambiguously based on what the audience is 
thought to be interested in. For television especially, this pursuit has led to a 
reassertion of its own agenda and notions of what is news. War, conflict and human 
tragedy, all of which make good pictures and can be found abundantly in the post – 
Cold War period, dominate, the televised picture of the world that most Americans 
receive.  
 
For example, while there were an estimated 25 crises around the globe in 1993, 
cameras were not following each one, of course. Yet, increasingly, where the camera is 
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and what it captures determine whether a crisis or issue is on the official agenda and 
the public’s collective foreign policy concerns. Other conflicts and other tragedies no 
less costly in human life are ignored. It takes a major effort of political will and 
communication by officials to put these events before the public eye. This paradox is 
captured in the observation that Sudan’s brutal civil war is "Somalia without CNN". A 
reporter for another U.S. T.V. network put it another way: "If 68 people are killed 
when a mortar shell explodes in a Sarajevo marketplace (as they were in February 
1994), it gets attention because cameras were there to record it. But, if a thousand 
people are killed off-camera in Huambo, Angola, the same day, it has absolutely no 
impact on anybody’s thought processes whatever".  52 
 
Similarly, in the case of the NAFTA it appears that the media devoted a substantial 
amount of coverage to this issue as it was a more attractive issue to cover from the 
media’s perspective. That is, in terms of proximity, prominence and timeliness and 
containing elements of conflict and controversy NAFTA was more appealing for the 
media to cover than the transformation of the GATT into the WTO – an issue which 
was similar in type to NAFTA.  Thus, if a story has the potential to engage the 
audience more then news editors are more likely to give that story more coverage than 
one which would not engage the audience as much.  This is because death, conflict, 
fear and the danger of job losses can be exploited by the media, and there is a 
temptation to run with such stories especially if they are close to home like NAFTA or 
can be graphically illustrated.  That is to say, if it can be shown to be bleeding then it 
should be leading.  With regard to NAFTA the “bleeding” would have meant job 
52  Data found in Warren Strobel, Late- Breaking Foreign Policy, U.S.Institute of Peace, 1997. 
Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)
       42 
losses, as this was close to home, and Perot provided the high profile personality.   
 
For example, in the debate over GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 
1994 leading to the World Trade Organisation, there was far less reported conflict in 
Congress than when the NAFTA treaty was being considered for approval. GATT, 
although it did not sail through Congress unopposed, raised far fewer hackles among 
either the citizenry or members of Congress. Consequently, GATT also received far 
less attention in the media.53  It was just not close enough to home and did not seem to 
threaten jobs in the same way and did not have a champion to oppose it like Ross 
Perot.   
 
In fact, no prominent figure arose to lead the opposition to GATT until late in the 
game when Senator Ernest Hollings, a Democrat from South Carolina, vowed on 
September 28, 1994, to prevent the GATT ratification proposal from reaching a vote.  
In October 1994, Bob Dole, leader of the Republicans in the Senate, also raised some 
opposition to GATT but later gave the agreement his blessing. Neither Hollings nor 
Dole however had the high profile in 1994 that Ross Perot had in 1993. As a result, the 
media gave less attention to Hollings and Dole’s opposition to GATT than they had 
devoted to the NAFTA battle. 54   Indeed, the fact that the NAFTA ratification process 
was cast as a true political battle over domestic jobs was the primary reason it received 
more coverage than GATT did.  
 
53  Charlyne Berens, Amplifying the Giant Sucking Sound: Ross Perot and the Media in the NAFTA 
negotiations, Newspaper Research Journal, Gale Group, 22nd March 1999, 3. 
54 Ibid, 4. 
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As the media frequently use conflict to frame information, they also found Ross Perot 
to churn up plenty of conflict over NAFTA during most of 1993.  For example, he had 
announced his opposition to NAFTA before a congressional committee in March.  
Then, by the end of May he had purchased t.v. time to denouce the “giant sucking 
sound” he said would result as U.S jobs headed south to Mexico, and challenged 
President Clinton to a televised debate on the treaty. Eventually, vice – president Al 
Gore accepted the challenge and he and Ross Perot faced off in a televised debate on 
the treaty watched in 11.2. million homes.  All of this was rather ironic as one of the 
main reasons for Clinton’s triumph over Bush in 1992 was the fact that he emphasised 
the importance of the economy, jobs and domestic renewal.   
 
Media attention to the NAFTA built as the battle grew and the final days of negotiation 
leading up to the November 17 and November 20 passage in the House and Senate 
respectively. Indeed, an examination of 26 news outlets sampled shows more than 
three times as many articles that included references to NAFTA in 1993 as to GATT in 
1994. 55  Similarly, the stories, commentaries, editorials and letters to the editor in the 
sample of news outlets examined referred to NAFTA a total of 12095 times and GATT 
a total of 3935 times. CNN referred to NAFTA in 1013 pieces during 1993, the 
highest total for the 26 news outlets examined, but recorded only 86 pieces with 
reference to GATT in 1994. 56 
55  Ibid. 
56  This figure is from a study by Charlene Berens where data was gathered from the on-line archives 
of twenty - three major Daily Newspapers, two Television Networks, and National Public Radio, 
counting the number of pieces in which key words such as NAFTA or North Atlantic Free Trade 
Agreement and GATT or General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs appeared during the time frame 
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Television’s newly found powerful agenda-setting ability accounts for a large portion 
of the complaints by Realists, foreign ministers and other senior government officials 
about the impact of today’s news media. The intensity of coverage that television 
devotes to a particular country or crisis may bear little or no relation to its importance 
to the national interest, at least as seen by officials. Official priorities may receive far 
less coverage, particularly if they cannot live up to television’s picture-driven, story 
telling needs. Traditionally, however, it is the foreign policy makers who have seen 
themselves as setting the nation’s overseas agenda, rather than having it set for them.  
 
Thus, the absence of the old bipolar agenda, fundamentally altered the way the U.S. 
news media reported on foreign affairs and their impact on those charged with making 
specified. Charlyne Berens, Amplifying the Giant Sucking Sound: Ross Perot and the Media in the 
NAFTA negotiations, Newspaper Research Journal, Gale Group, 22nd March 1999, 4.   
The Media Outlets searched were ABC TV, CNN TV, National Public Radio.  The Newspapers were 
Arizona Republic, Atlanta Journal Constitution, Baltimore Sun, Boston Globe, Charlotte Observer, 
Chicago Tribune, Detroit Free Press, Kanas City Star, Los Angeles Time, Miami Herald, Minneapolis 
Star Tribune, New York/Newsday, New York Times, Philadelphia Inquirer, Rocky Mountain News, 
San Diego Union Tribune, San Francisco Chronicle, San Jose Mercury News, St Louis Post - 
Dispatch,  St Paul Pioneer Press, Seattle Post - Intelligencer, Washington Post, USA Today.  
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foreign policy. Those changes were magnified a few years before the end of the Cold 
War by the appearance of new technologies that have transformed how news is 
gathered and reported to public audiences around the world. For example, in a speech 
on September 21, 1993, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake stated that "the 
pulse of the planet has accelerated dramatically, and with it, the pace of change in 
human events. Computer, faxes, fibre optic cables and satellites all speed up the flow 
of information around the globe." 57  As a CNN correspondent Mr Arnett, also pointed 
out, "today you can take a briefcase –size satellite phone anywhere in the world, from 
the middle of any action and make a report." 58  It means that there is far more 
opportunity for reporters to get access to action areas and to come up with insightful, 
accurate reports and commentaries.  
 
As noted earlier, these developments virtually obliterated the factor of time from 
diplomacy and foreign affairs. Television correspondents now are just expected to 
report the latest developments, (or just report in) constantly. For policy-makers, global 
television news services such as CNN and its growing number of competitors are a 
double-edged sword. That is to say, while the President can make his policy more 
rapidly known to the U.S. public and leaders around the world, opponents and allies 
can respond just as quickly. Officials feel pressure to react to televised images far more 
quickly than they would like. The public can vicariously experience war, diplomacy, 
and even the death of a famine victim as they happen. When the intermestic issue of 
NAFTA came to prominence and was seized on by the media largely because of the 
57  CNN Transcript, 7th May 1995, 3. 
58 Ibid. 
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controversy over possible  job losses publicised by Ross Perot this made the crafting of 
foreign policy regarding NAFTA more difficult and complex.  These developments, 
taken together point to a new leverage on the part of the news media over policy 
makers, but a number of factors limit the extent to which such leverage can be 
effective.  
 
Firstly, journalists’ agenda setting power is hardly new. The press "may not be 
successful much of the time in telling people what to think", Bernard Cohen wrote in 
"The Press and Foreign Policy" in 1963, but it is stunningly successful in telling people 
what to think about. 59  The daily briefing at the State Department illustrates how the 
news media for decades have helped set the agenda and force foreign policy decisions. 
Throughout the morning hours of almost every working day, public affairs 
representatives in each of the department’s bureau’s develop "press guidance", 
approved statements of policy used by the spokesperson at the briefing, based on 
anticipated questions from reporters. These policy statements are often drafted in 
response to events world wide, but just as often they are reactions to stories in the 
morning newspapers or the network newscasts the night before. Thus, agenda and 
actions are influenced, and sometimes policy is made in the process. On particularly 
sensitive issues, the Secretary of State’s senior staff or the Secretary personally 
oversees the preparation of press guidance. The process works in the negative, too: if 
reporters pepper the spokesperson with questions that he or she is not prepared for, 
that issue rapidly makes it on to the department’s agenda. What has changed since the 
time of Cohen’s study is television’s ability to bring these foreign policy problems to 
59  Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy, Little Brown, 1963, 53. 
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the attention of senior policy makers much more rapidly and graphically. This, in turn, 
begins a snowball effect, as editors and reporters from other major and minor news 
outlets drop what they are doing and latch on to the new story, pushing it higher up the 
agenda for all concerned. T.V. can thus reinforce the type of pack journalism that has 
been widely criticised in the past. 60  Moreover, as many print journalists lament, 
television has an impact in a way that they never can. Printed stories of atrocities, 
casualties and so forth can almost always be denied, disputed or downplayed; video 
cannot be so easily dismissed, even if it lacks the context and background of a 
newspaper report.  
 
Secondly, one has to clearly distinguish between the power to set an agenda and the 
power to make policy decisions. Deciding what is and is not a priority may be a 
formidable power, but, it is not the same as deciding what action to take on a particular 
problem or actually taking that action. Thus, there are things that the news media for 
all their intrinsic power to bring attention to an issue, cannot do. As many senior 
Western diplomats complain, the print and broadcast media can urge action without 
being responsible for the consequences. Inevitably, the details and execution (and by 
extension their consequences) are almost always left up to policy-makers, diplomats 
and military planners. 61 
 
Thirdly, the president, the Secretary of State, and other foreign policy officials retain 
formidable agenda setting powers of their own. When the president chooses to 
60  See Warren Strobel, Late-breaking Foreign Policy, U.S. Institute of Peace, 1997, 15 for a further 
discussion. 
61 Ibid, 67. 
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highlight a foreign policy problem or makes a decision on relations with another state, 
the news media are compelled to report it – the print media almost always, television 
less so. The problem is that, given the current state of U.S. foreign policy, such actions 
now often seem without context. The superpower conflict helped presidents explain 
their policies through the news media and helped the news media in turn report them to 
the public. So far, no satisfactory replacement has been devised for the doctrine of 
containment as a guiding principle for U.S. foreign policy. Thus, what has changed is 
not so much the media’s behaviour as their opportunities for pursuing their own 
agenda. The lack of an overarching guide to foreign policy during the 1990s and the 
availability of new technologies have granted T.V. and the rest of the news media an 
independence from officialdom not enjoyed during the Cold War, or, arguably post 
9/11.  
 
Finally, it must be emphasised that the media’s role in the foreign policy arena is 
sharply limited by a relative inattention to foreign affairs. Few reporters are paid to 
cover international affairs, and television programming is overwhelmingly oriented 
towards domestic news. For example, Doris Graber reports that major Chicago 
newspapers devote about 6% of their space to international news and that television 
networks give about 20%. 62  In part, this is due to the absence of a mass market for 
foreign policy news in the face of industry efforts to boost profits. An exception to the 
comparatively scant attention other media give to foreign policy, is the coverage it 
receives in the so-called "prestige press". One study for example, showed that the New 
62  Doris Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993, 84. 
Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)
       49 
York Times allotted over 40% of its total coverage to foreign news. 63  Yet, how many 
people consume that coverage remains problematic, as the circulation of the Times 
constitutes but a fraction of the nation’s newspaper subscribers. In a similar vein, the 
24-hour Cable Network News Network may provide coverage of world news around 
the clock, but its audience is relatively minuscule unless there is a crisis or other 
galvanising event.  In fact, the 21st century has seen a further shift still to an interactive 
media where the consumer can select the outlets and topics from which they receive 
news and information updates, such as through internet blogs, or other social networks 
like twitter, or news channel updates or specific issues.  This type of shift make things 
like high audience numbers ratings less likely as well. 
 
While there is no doubt that in the post – Cold War period, the media puts intense 
pressure on officials to respond rapidly, increasing the difficulty of policy-making.  It is 
now simply harder for officials to make policy in a vacuum, ensuring at least a 
modicum of transparency and pluralism in the government decision-making process. 
Thus, recent changes in the international arena and technology have lead to today’s 
media affecting agenda - setting and the process of policy-making.  Its affects on 
policy itself and its implementation however, is far less and these claims will be 
demonstrated in the case study of NAFTA. 
 
 
 
63  Charles W Kegley Eugene R Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, St Martin’s Press,  5th Ed,  
1995, 328. 
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4.  Outline of NAFTA 
 
 
As international relations commentators such as Kenneth Waltz, Robert Jervis and 
Robert Goldel have pointed out, there are often four levels of analysis that can be 
identified in trying to understand the creation of U.S. foreign policy, be that with 
regard to crisis, strategic or structural policy making : system, state, bureaucracy and 
individuals.  64  While each American foreign policy will be influenced to varying 
degrees by factors from any of these levels, competition with the Soviet Union 
provided a dominant context or paradigm that affected system, state, bureaucracy and 
individual in-puts and thus guided much of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War 
era. For example, while there were sound economic reasons for assisting in the 
reconstruction and redevelopment of western Europe and Japan after World War 2, 
there was also a very important security rationale: the U.S. would not only create 
strong markets for goods and trading partners in these countries, but their economic 
vitality would help them resist communism and assist the U.S. in countering the Soviet 
Union.  
 
As we have noted from the earlier discussion with the demise of that dominant 
paradigm, in the early to mid-1990s, the overriding goals and priorities of U.S. Foreign 
Policy became more diffuse and numerous. For example, humanitarian relief, 
peacekeeping, economic goals, promoting democracy and the environment were and 
64  See Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War, Columbia University Press, 1959, Robert Jervis, 
Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton University Press, 1976, and 
M.Chambers, R.Goldel, Beyond the Waters Edge, White House Studies, Nova Science Publisher Inc, 
1st January 2004, for a further discussion. 
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are issues of concern to both the public and policymakers. Indeed, in the immediate 
post – Cold War era, scholars debated the merits of various potential strategies that 
might replace containment. 65  U.S. foreign policy meanwhile, continued on an ad hoc 
basis. While it is still debatable whether the "War on Terror" has emerged as a 
sufficient guiding post for American foreign policy in the post- 9/11 era, there are a 
number of trends evident in American foreign policy during the period 1993 - 1998 
that strongly influenced the character of U.S. foreign policy. Two of these key trends 
include: 
1 – The economy was accorded greater priority compared to Cold War emphasis on 
military and security issues.  
2 – A greater involvement of domestic actors and constituencies in U.S. foreign policy.  
 
In order to further investigate these trends and test the hypothesis of a greater 
involvement of domestic actors and economic issues in the U.S. foreign policy process 
in the post – Cold War era, this study now turns to consider the public reaction to the 
NAFTA ratification and NAFTA expansion. This chapter considers how the public and 
domestic factors played a large role in the case of the NAFTA ratification, and as a 
result affected the substance and content of the agreement that was negotiated and 
passed. 66  This is not to say that public opinion decided the policy outcome, but, to a 
greater extent than in the Cold War era, it was able to affect the process and the 
65  For example, a number of books such as Lester Thurow’s Head to Head the Coming Economic 
Battle among Japan, Europe and America, Warner Books Inc, 1992, and Clyde Prestowitz’s 
Powernomics: Economic and Strategy after the Cold War, University Press of America, 1991 argued 
that international economic issues had supplanted the military security concerns of the Cold War era. 
66  This stands in contrast to previous conventional wisdom about the role and effect of public opinion 
and other domestic actors in U.S. Foreign Policy.   
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agenda.  With regard to NAFTA however, they did not determine the outcome in 
1993, though arguably they did in 1998.    
 
Summary of NAFTA provisions: 
The aim of NAFTA was ambitious: to eliminate the barriers to trade for all goods and 
services between the U.S., Mexico, and Canada; to eliminate barriers to investment and 
provide greater security for investors; and to establish new rules for government 
procurement, intellectual property and dispute settlement. 67  It would not be easy to 
reach these goals, as no trade agreement so sweeping had ever been negotiated among 
countries at such different levels of economic development. Moreover, the negotiators 
would engage three different political systems, three different societies with cultural 
differences.  In each country, the negotiators had to consult with committees from 
government agencies, advisory committees from the private sectors as well as 
legislators. 68  The internal process was particularly intense in the United States, where 
the negotiations would be conducted in an atmosphere of much greater public scrutiny 
than any previous trade negotiation. Further, the treaty would still have to go before 
Congress for its approval.  
 
Yet, in the main, NAFTA achieved its goals. At its most basic, NAFTA added Mexico 
to the Free Trade agreement that had been negotiated between Canada and the United 
States in 1988 but also broadened the scope of that agreement. 69  The key features of 
67  Frederick W Mayer, Interpreting NAFTA, Columbia University Press, 1998, 109. 
68 Ibid. 
69  R E Baldwin C S Magee, Congressional Trade Votes From Nafta Approval to Fast Track Defeat, 
Institute for International Economics, 2000, 5. 
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NAFTA are the elimination of tariffs and most non-tariff barriers to trade among the 
three countries over a 10 –year period (15 –years for some import sensitive products). 
The agreement also features the requirement that the U.S., Canadian and Mexican 
investors be treated as well as domestic investors and as favourably as any other 
foreign investors (the so-called national treatment and most favoured nation 
provisions). 70  Specifically, the NAFTA establishes free trade in agricultural products 
between the United States and Mexico. Tariff rate quotas were also introduced to 
allow the different markets time to adjust, so, for example, Mexico was not initially 
allowed to export all of its sugar produce to the U.S. as this could severely hurt U.S. 
producers.  So quota tariffs were introduced which would allow Mexico to export a 
certain percentage of a particular good until all the quotas could be phased out over a 
15 year period and thus give American producers time to adjust and compete with the 
influx of Mexican produce in their market. 71  
 
On the whole, NAFTA was a success and did much of what the negotiators set out to 
do, but if the text had simply aimed to free trade it could have been far shorter. What 
required the 2000 pages and most negotiating were matters concerning how far and 
fast each country would move to free investment, and what "rules of origin" would 
determine if a product qualified for free trade, and matters such as what procedures 
would be used to settle disputes. 72  For this and other reasons it is not just the fact but 
70  Ibid. 
71 Safeguard measures were also written into the agreement that would temporarily restore tariff 
protection if employment in an industry was badly hit by increases in imports.  Joesph  A McKinnley, 
Created From NAFTA, M. E. Sharpe Inc., 2000, 11. 
72  Louis Hamilton, Why The President Needs the Help of Congress to Make Foreign Policy, National 
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also the form of the agreement that is of interest. This point will be investigated later in 
this chapter by looking at the deals and agreements made in order to secure passage of 
NAFTA with other domestic actors in the U.S. policy making arena. 
  
Factors influencing how members of Congress vote: 
When Harry Truman was President he was asked who made U.S. foreign policy.  His 
reply was simply: "I do".  For observers of 21st Century U.S. foreign policy, no 
president could make that claim today.  In fact, according to Professor Lee Hamilton, 
not since John F. Kennedy was President has foreign policy been the preserve of even a 
few policy makers let alone just one.  As the U.S. engages the world with renewed 
vigour and interest in the wake of the September 11th attacks and the war in 
Afghanistan, this is a point worth keeping in mind. The Congress is also an important 
player in foreign policy.  While this fact may seem inconvenient in times of crisis, it 
actually benefits the country in many ways.  For example, by linking constituents and 
ordinary citizens to the policy making process, Congress can help deliver a more 
participatory and democratic policy process.  Similarly, the Congress can add to the 
foreign process through its committee roles and oversight functions.  
 
In fact, the question of the extent to which members of Congress concern themselves 
with the preferences of their constituents has occupied many scholars of Congress.  
Logically we would expect members to be most concerned with voter preferences 
Public Radio Transcript, 28th October 2004, 1. 
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when those preferences are likely to affect their prospects for re-election. 73  Most of 
the time, however, the majority of voters are unaware of the issues, let alone how their 
member votes. Nevertheless, strong anecdotal evidence indicates that members do 
concern themselves with voters, even when voter interest is small. This can be 
illustrated by considering factors influencing how members of Congress vote. 74 
 
How a member decides to vote depends upon a changing matrix of factors.  Before a 
major vote, Members are often overwhelmed with differing opinions, sometimes sent 
months, weeks, and even minutes prior to voting. Congressional offices receive 
mailbags full of letters, emails, faxes, and phone calls from constituents, all expressing 
a wide array of conflicting opinion. Members receive statements from expert witnesses 
testifying before congressional hearings. Special interest groups send them background 
material. Congressional agencies provide reports and studies. In short, there is ample 
material on both sides of any issue placed before the Congress. Making the important 
decision of how to vote however, involves a complex process of interaction between 
Members and a variety of influences. It is not easy to categorize the process of making 
that decision as it is an individual one. According to Lee Hamilton, usually, the 
following five factors are present in the process:  
 Information Gathering  
 Constituency Interests  
 Expert Opinion  
 Political Ramifications  
73  Frederick W Mayer, Interpreting NAFTA, Columbia University Press, 1998, 322. 
74  Ibid.  
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 Personal Judgement 75 
 
In the process of information gathering Members of Congress become familiar with the 
arguments given by the various sides surrounding a policy issue. Members of Congress 
also have access to neutral, objective research and analysis on issue proposals from the 
Congressional Research Service. In addition, committee reports, newspaper articles, 
editorials, statements from the Administration, and letters from other Members also 
give them a sense of the arguments surrounding an issue. When reviewing this 
material, Members also pay attention to factors such as cost to the taxpayer, benefit to 
society overall, and perceived consequences for the future.  
 
A closely allied factor to gathering information on the issue is gathering information on 
the views of constituents.  Members spend a great deal of time seeking an accurate 
idea of how a majority of their constituents feel about specific legislative proposals. 
They do not rely exclusively on the correspondence or calls received by their office, for 
they understand that many constituents will not take the initiative to contact them. 
They are also fully aware that those constituents and groups with passionate views on 
a subject will organise mass mailings or a barrage of phone calls or visits that may not 
accurately reflect the wider electorate.  
 
75  Voting is one of the most important responsibilities held by a member of Congress.  Members are 
called on hundreds of times a year to vote on a vast amount of bills, motions and amendments.  For 
example, in the 1997 -98 Congress, Senators cast 612 floor votes and House members cast 1187.  
Louis Hamilton, Why The President Needs the Help of Congress to Make Foreign Policy, National 
Public Radio Transcript, 28th October 2004, 2. 
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Rather than rely only on the voices of those constituents who volunteer their opinion, 
most Members engage actively in outreach to a broader spectrum of the electorate. 
Virtually every Member of Congress goes home several times a month to meet with 
constituents, holds open office hours and meetings in community centres. They closely 
follow public opinion surveys, and often undertake polling of their own constituents. 
Members are aware that they have a responsibility to reflect the viewpoint of a 
majority of their constituents, and that if they fail to read the pulse of public opinion, a 
majority of the voters in that area will find someone else in the next election who does. 
76 
 
According to Kegley and Wittkopf, it often helps members to become informed about 
the views of respected outside experts and known authorities in an issue area. 
Members also rely on the recommendations of experts and known authorities in an 
issue area. They also rely on the recommendations of experts and colleagues within 
Congress, whose judgement and specialisation in particular issues are respected – 
especially senior colleagues with experience such as committee chairmen.  
 
While members depend heavily on outside groups and experts for policy analysis, they 
also turn to each other for an understanding of the broader political ramifications of a 
vote. For example, senior members may solicit votes and point out the political 
rewards – committee assignments or congressional committee campaign contributions 
– that might be received by those who help pass an item. 77 
76  Ibid, 2. 
77  Ibid. 
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Finally, members of Congress do not arrive as blank slates, awaiting only the directives 
of others. Their own personal histories and key beliefs definitely influence their voting 
decisions. In the end, every member has issues where their personal judgement 
overrides other arguments, so Member’s core beliefs and personal identities do matter 
when they decide how to vote. 78  For example, in his memoirs “All the Best: My Life 
in Letters and Other Writings” President George Bush Senior noted how his own 
military service impacted on any decisions he made about using U.S. force. 79  
 
Indeed, through some interviews with Ike Skelton, Mickey Edwards and Bill 
Richardson who were Congress members in the 1980s, Richard Strobel found that at 
times Congress members use their own offices and contacts to gain expertise and 
knowledge in order to make decisions or fight for a particular point of view on an 
issue. 80  Moreover, and with regard to public opinion, as each member of Congress 
votes they know that they will be held accountable for the decision they are about to 
make.  Indeed, while traditionally scholars of public opinion argued that there are a 
number of weaknesses in the proposition that the public would influence foreign policy 
78  Ibid. 
79  G. Bush, All the Best: My Life in Letters and Other Writings, Scriber, New York 1999, 52 and 
506. 
80  The interviews were taken at a conference at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University  in 
1989 and I personally spoke to Richard Sobel about them.  The transcripts and details of them can 
also be found in Richard Sobel, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Controversy over Contra Aid, 
Rowan and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1994, and Richard Sobel The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. 
Foreign Policy since Vietnam, Oxford University Press, 2001. 
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by choosing whose policies they most preferred, they overlooked the better way that 
public opinion can and does exert influence or control in elections is not prospectively 
but retrospectively. 81  That is to say it provides a deterrent effect for unpopular and/or 
dangerous policies: the people responsible will not be re-elected.  Therefore a better 
way in which public opinion can and does exercise effective influence or control in 
elections is not prospectively but retrospectively.  V. O. Key argues that elections are 
referendums on performance, and policy - makers are held accountable by the 
electorate if their policies foreign as well as domestic fail.  Consequently, although 
public opinion offers very little guidance for policy - makers on what the details of 
policies should be, Damocles’ sword of punishment is always overhead.  As one 
member of Congress said of his constituent, “you have to be as smart in prospect as 
they are in retrospect”. 82 
 
81  For example, while the most obvious  way for the public to influence foreign policy would be 
through elections, there are some problems with this suggestion.  Firstly, elections are dependent 
overwhelmingly on a candidate’s domestic policies. In fact, the historical record shows that even 
during periods of international crises elections remain focused on domestic politics.  According to R 
Barnet for example, “there has never been a national election that was a clear plebiscite on an issue of 
foreign policy there are too many other issues invariably involved”, for example in both the 1964 and 
1968 elections during the peak of the Vietnam War there were many domestic issues involved.  This 
is not to say that Vietnam was not also an important issue, though, even when there is an overriding 
public concern about a foreign policy, as during Vietnam, the candidates have not presented a clear 
choice on the issue of war and peace.  This leads to the second point; that party differences are few on 
foreign policy.  For example, at the height of the Vietnam War in 1968, both major presidential 
candidates - Humphrey and Nixon, endorsed the policies of gradual de - escalation that most 
Americans favoured. Benjamin Page Mark Petracca, The American Presidency McGraw Hill Book 
Company, 1983, 363.  
82   William Leogrande, “Did the Public Matter? The Impact of Opinion on Congressional Support for 
Ronald Reagan’s Nicaragua Policy” in Richard Sobel, The Controversy of Contra Aid, Rowan and 
Littlefield Publishers inc, 1994, 168. 
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As we have seen, foreign policy issues with the exception of key ones where the public 
perceive their interests to be involved, pass by with the public taking little notice.  But, 
as a different member of Congress claimed, “you have to be very careful and try to 
judge which issues will blow up into key issues”. 83   To avoid touching off a negative 
reaction from the electorate then, members of Congress and the executive branch are 
more likely to modify their positions incrementally.  The result being a conception of 
policy change that closely resembles Key’s conception of opinion dikes.  Public opinion 
rarely if ever dictates policies Key argued, but instead it establishes the outer limits of 
acceptable government action, bulwarks marking the margins of public tolerance (but 
only on issues that are salient to the public). 84 
 
Thus the opinion context fixes or sets general limits themselves subject to change 
within which action may be taken.  By studying the way policy - makers observe and 
evaluate external opinion and the affects these may have on their policy - making 
behaviour, Cohen also concludes that, policy - makers perceive in the environment 
outside of their political orbit, encouragements or limitations that facilitate or modify 
their preferred behaviour.  As Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated: 
“Throughout my long years in government, I have found that the American people 
expect their government to travel on a broad highway of policy which responds to their 
own simple and decent purposes and that when government wanders over toward the 
soft shoulders on either side of the road the people have a dozen ways to nudge the 
83 Ibid.  
84    V, O, Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, Knopf, 1961, 552 - 553. 
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public vehicle back on to the hard surface.” 85   
 
Anecdotes abound of policy decisions that were affected by the fear of adverse public 
reaction.  For example, President L B Johnson was said to have worried initially that 
disengagement from Vietnam would provoke a popular backlash on the right, 
subjecting the nation to a trauma like the bitter debate in the 1950s over “Who Lost 
China” to communism.  Examples, also show that in elections the electorate will punish 
presidents for foreign policy failures.  Consider for example, President Carter’s 
electoral fate.  The public generally gave Carter high marks on personal attributes (e.g. 
integrity) but low marks on performance.  Public evaluations of his foreign policy 
performance were especially critical and generally parallel his overall decline in 
popularity.  Following the seizure of the American embassy personnel in Tehran, the 
president’s inability to secure their release seemed to have fuelled public dissatisfaction 
with the president’s overall performance.  For example, between September 1979 and 
September 1980 the percentage of people who thought Carter was handling foreign 
affairs well declined from 77% to 23%.  Similarly, between October 1979 and August 
1980 the percentage of Americans who approved of Carter’s performance fell from 
60% to 21%. 86  It follows then that the fear of electoral consequences enables the 
prevailing “climate of opinion” to influence foreign policy.   
 
Indeed, a number of studies working on the premise of re - election being the main 
motivation for members of Congress’ voting decisions which can be applied to the vote 
85    Bernard Cohen, The public‘s impact of Foreign Policy, Little Brown, 1973, 18. 
86    Figures supplied by Gallup in Charles W Kegley Eugene R Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, St 
Martin’s Press,  5th Ed, 1995, 280. 
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on NAFTA.  For example, in an investigation of how factors most influence 
Congressmen’s vote, Cherryholmes and Shapiro found that a member would first 
assess his opinion, this would include taking account of their delegation, region, 
constituency, ideological, committee and leadership influences. 87  If after making this 
assessment they found themselves to have a strong pre-disposition then this would rule 
their decision.  If not, then Cherryholmes and Shapiro suggest that the member is now 
entering a second phrase where they will seek out more information from other 
colleagues and indeed the president. 88 
 
This conception by Cherryholmes and Shapiro seems plausible and can be used as a 
way to understand how a member of Congress can prioritise the most important 
influences on his decision.  For example, by taking this further and introducing the 
issue of “timing” Box - Steffenmeier and Arnold, used statements by all 435 members 
of Congress on NAFTA to assess when they likely made their decision to definitely 
support or oppose NAFTA. 89  This was done by using a statement the Congressman 
had made indicating themselves to be undecided in comparison to a subsequent 
statement declaring their position to be either in support or opposing the agreement.   
 
In doing this, Box - Steffenmeier and Arnold found the largest two variables 
influencing a member and compelling him to have a clear and early position were 
87 Cleo H Cherryholmes Michael Shapiro, Representatives and Roll Calls, Bobbs Merril Company, 
1969, 37. 
88 Ibid, 69. 
89 Janet M Box - Steffensmeier Laura W Arnold Christopher J Zorn,  “Strategic Position Taking and 
the Timing of Voting Decisions in Congress - A Study of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement,” Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, 1995, 9. 
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socioeconomic.  Such as districts with lower household incomes tending to produce 
members who were clearly less supportive of NAFTA due to the threat of job losses.  
Or districts with a high level of union membership also opposing NAFTA more of the 
time. 90   
The investigation into using timing as a variable also found that members with 
leadership and ‘cue - giving’ or senior positions declared their positions significantly 
earlier. 91  While other scholars investigating this topic, such as Sullivan and Uslander 
illustrated that lobbying by the President can also switch votes some of the time. 92  As 
Uslander shows, by being active, meeting and talking to members of Congress on 
NAFTA, Clinton’s efforts had the intended effect with legislators who were lobbied by 
the President  being more likely to back NAFTA. 93  Thus, in conclusion the factors 
that influence a Member’s voting decision are not a matter of science but of individual 
90 Ibid 15-16.  
Box - Steffenmeier and Arnold plan to use their findings on the timings about members reaching a 
decision in future research along with data on which members were contacted, when, and by whom - 
such as leaders or interest groups, in order to further examine influences on voting.  Ibid, 11. 
91 Ibid, 29. 
Note: ‘Cue - givers’ refers to government  members who serve in leadership positions and give 
endorsements which help others learn about the issue and then decide to either oppose or support the 
measure.  Q Monson L A Murray K D Patterson “Dominant Cue givers and voting on Ballot 
propositions” paper presented at Western Political Science Association, California, 17th March 2009,  
www.allacademic.com/meta. 
92 See Terry Sullivan, “The Bank Account Presidency: A New Measure and Evidence on the Temporal 
Path of Presidential Influence,” American Journal of Political Science, 35, 1991, 686 -723 and Eric M 
Uslaner, “Trade Winds: NAFTA, the Rational Public, and the Responsive Congress”, University of 
Maryland of College Park, Manuscript 1995, for a further discussion on this. 
93 Eric M Uslaner, “Trade Winds: NAFTA, the Rational Public, and the Responsive Congress”, 
University of Maryland of College Park, Manuscript 1995, 15. 
According to Uslander, members that were lobbied by the president  were 44% more likely to back 
NAFTA than those who were not.  Ibid, 349. 
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and varied circumstances. Moreover, as each member votes they know that in the U.S. 
democracy they alone will be held accountable for the decision they are about to make.  
 
Illustrations of Congress affecting changes in law on foreign policy: 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the post-Cold War era altered the pitch on 
which U.S. foreign policy is played, and saw increased access and influence by several 
domestic actors. With the end of the Cold War, the strong influence of international – 
system level factors on U.S. foreign policy - such as the power of the Soviet Union 
relative to that of the U.S. largely disappeared. This allowed a greater role for 
domestic level factors to shape American policy. As a result, the period from the early 
1990s to mid – 1990s being considered in this study has played witness to Congress 
taking a greater role in trying to shape U.S. foreign policy.  
 
Consider for example a number of initiatives stemming from members of Congress that 
became important facets of U.S. foreign policy. For example, efforts of members of the 
Senate and House of Representatives to revamp the finances of the United Nations, 
and holding back U.S. dues to the U.N. to cut funding of international agencies that 
might in turn fund abortions in other countries. Similarly, Congress also forced the 
President to accept automatic sanctions against foreign countries such as India and 
Pakistan for violations of the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act. 94  Indeed, as 
the following examples from the late 1990s and the early 21st Century will testify the 
role played by the Congress in American foreign policy is more significant and at times 
94  M Chambers R Goldel, Beyond the Waters Edge, White House Studies, Nova Science Publisher 
Inc, 1st January 2004, 2. 
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results in changes to the law.  
 
In the case of the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) the European Union challenged 
United States legislation that provided special tax treatment for the export sales of 
U.S. firms carried out through Foreign Sales Corporations. (Foreign Sales 
Corporations are subsidiaries based outside the U.S., often in tax havens, and through 
which export sales were often diverted). Since part of the income made by these sales 
was not subject to corporate income tax, the European Union argued that Foreign 
Sales Corporation’s were providing a subsidy to American firms which violated 
agreements made by the World Trade Organisation.  
 
Subsequently, a World Trade Organisation panel found that the FSC arrangement did 
represent a subsidy. Attempting to address this the U.S. Congress passed legislation in 
2000 altering the scheme. Yet, the W.T.O panel again found that this legislation did 
not comply with World Trade Organisation agreements. 95  As a consequence, the 
European Union was authorised to put trade sanctions on the United States up to 
$4043 million a year which represented 2.5% of total U.S. exports to the European 
Union. 96  When this amount progressively increased to 5% the U.S. Congress changed 
tax laws to eliminate the illegal subsidy provided by the Foreign Sales Corporations 
provisions.  
 
A second case involved the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (the 
95  Breuss, F "W.T.O. Dispute Settlement: An Economic Analysis of four E.U. – U.S. Mini Trade 
Wars: A Survey, Journal of Industry Competition and Trade 4 , 2004, 275-315, 285. 
96  Ibid, 288. 
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so-called Byrd Amendment) which was added to an appropriations bill by Senator 
Robert Byrd of West Virginia. This Act stated that monies collected from the 
antidumping penalties and countervailing duties would be paid to the firms that had 
filed the trade remedy petitions rather than being applied to the federal budget as it has 
been previously. This act was of great concern to the major trading partners of the 
United States. Thus, the European Union along with ten other countries challenged the 
Byrd Amendment and called for a W.T.O. panel to rule on whether or not it was 
compatible with U.S. obligations as a member of the W.T.O. The panel ruled that it 
was not and ordered that it be changed. 97  On May 1st 2005, the European Union and 
Canada began putting retaliatory duties on United States products and Japan followed 
in doing the same. 98   
 
Although the U.S. Congress strongly opposed repealing the Act, as Senator Byrd was 
a very distinguished and respected senator, the retaliatory trade actions eventually 
resulted in appeal. While not directly from the period being considered in this study this 
case again nevertheless represents an instance where Congress exerted formidable 
sway on U.S foreign policy.  This kind of new found Congressional confidence in 
foreign policy making had to be managed by the Executive in passing and then trying 
to expand NAFTA.   
 
 
 
97  Ibid, 311. 
98 Ibid. 
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Fast Track procedures used for Congress’ approval of the NAFTA 
agreement: 
With regard to the ratification of NAFTA the stage was set for the involvement of 
domestic factors from the request for a fast – track authority. For Mexico and Canada, 
once President Salinas (Mexican President) and Prime Minister Mulroney (Canadian 
Prime Minister) made their respective commitments to NAFTA, the decision was made 
to go ahead with negotiations. In the United States however, the situation was not as 
straightforward, as the U.S. Constitution divides power among the branches of 
government, and Congress not the President regulates foreign trade. Thus, to stand any 
chance of successfully negotiating the NAFTA, President Bush would first need to 
obtain "fast track" negotiating authority from Congress. 99 
 
Fast track refers to the process by which Congress assigns responsibility to the 
president to negotiate on its behalf and it subsequently only involves itself in limited 
debate (hence "fast track") and to an up – down vote, without amendment, on the 
agreement that the president has reached.  100   Consider for example when Congress 
99  Frederick W Mayer Interpreting NAFTA, Columbia University Press,  1998, 67. 
100  Although the president can initiate new trade negotiations without fast - track authority, most 
trade experts believe that other countries will not be forthcoming with significant trade - liberating 
offers without legislation in place to prevent Congress from blocking or modifying U.S. concessions 
by amending the legislation. R E Baldwin C S Magee, Congressional Trade Votes From Nafta 
Approval to Fast Track Defeat, Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C. 2000, 2.   
The benefit of fast track is that it enables the executive to enjoy the necessary leeway and credibility to 
negotiate trade agreements (or agreements) without legislators making amendments that could delay 
and even cripple controversial bills.  Thus, fast track allows a trade deal to be negotiated and then 
Congress must accept or reject it with no changes made.  I M Destler, American Trade Politics, The 
Twentieth Century Fund, 2nd Ed, 1994, 77.   
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gave the president fast track authority for free trade negotiations with Israel and 
Canada, as well as for the Uruguay Round of GATT. With regard to the NAFTA 
negotiation, the previous 1988 Trade Act had authorised the fast track for three years, 
with a provision that gave the president two more years if he requested it. So, as long 
as there was no veto by a majority of either  the Senate or the House of Congress, 
President Bush could ask for an extension of fast track in 1991 that would last until 
1993.  
 
When Bush asked for an extension in March 1991 however, a remarkably diverse 
collection of interest groups with stakes in NAFTA had mobilised to oppose fast track 
or insist on conditions that be attached to its approval. 101  This was to prove a major 
complication in the Administration’s foreign economic policy making.   
 
Indeed, Bush faced opposition from industries which previously had not been involved 
in trade politics.  These were mainly producers who felt that cheap Mexican goods 
being imported could harm their business, such as manufacturers of glass, apparel, 
brooms or other labour intensive industries and farmers of certain products like warm 
winter vegetables, citrus fruit and sugar cane.  Similarly, the perception for huge 
competition from Mexican workers who worked for only a fraction of the cost of their 
U.S. counterparts led to organised labour groups opposing any extension of fast track 
for fear it would enable the passage of NAFTA. 102  Indeed, the main interest groups 
opposing the fast track was the AFL - CIO who were concerned that U.S. companies 
101 Ibid. 
102  Frederick W Mayer Interpreting NAFTA, Columbia University Press,  1998, 68. 
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would relocate to Mexico causing a loss of jobs in the U.S., especially unionised jobs.  
Other interest groups included food safety, workers, human rights groups, and 
environmental groups.   
 
Even though a large number of industries such as banks and other financial institutions, 
and the major automakers supported the fast - track extension and NAFTA, the 
opposition began gaining enough support to make getting an extension problematic.   
For example, as Mac Arthur noted, there was soon over 60 groups formed in 
opposition, and their movement was gaining even more support, particularly with some 
help from Richard Gephardt, the Democratic Majority leader of the House of 
Representatives and Michael Wessel, Gephardt’s long - time advisor on trade.  
Gephardt’s influence lay in the fact that he could attract more opponents to NAFTA  
and in particular influence some House Democrats who could be seen to hold swing 
votes. 103  In addition, members of Congress had also learned from the Canada - U.S. 
Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA)  that the fast - track was the key point in a trade 
agreement where they could have an impact or influence, as once the fast - track was 
passed their concerns would be neglected.   This was learned from the  CUFTA  in 
that, granting fast -track for the CUFTA had no sizeable opposition, however, unions 
and other opponents discovered during the final agreement debates that their chance to 
affect or influence the terms of the agreement had been more or less taken from them 
by the passage of fast track. 104   
 
103 John R Mac Arthur, The Selling of Free Trade” NAFTA, Washington and the Subversion of 
American Democracy, Hill and Wang, 2000, 113. 
104 Frederick W Mayer Interpreting NAFTA, Columbia University Press,  1998, 98. 
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To illustrate how the new groups getting involved in the debate over fast - track 
brought a host of new issues and domestic actors into the realm of trade policy it is 
helpful to consider the actions by the Bush administration to secure an extension to fast 
track which was vital to pursuing the NAFTA.  Particularly, in order to gain enough 
Congressional votes to renew the fast - track due to expire in June 1991, the Bush 
administration led a full campaign to gain the needed support.  Along with two of his 
political allies, Nick Calio and Josh Bolton, the Bush administration strategy was 
simply to put peer pressure on Gephardt from other Democrat’s and somehow lessen 
their potential to increase opposition to fast track.  As they were sure that Gephardt 
would not like to be portrayed as against trade per se, as trade was generally seen as 
the key to increasing U.S. economic activity, they worked two main angles.  First, they 
gained support of other large democratic figures such as Treasury Secretary Lloyd 
Bentsen, the House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Daniel Rostenkowski and 
Bill Richardson - a formidable popular Democrat who Gephardt would find difficult to 
handle.  Secondly, they exploited the uncertainties he had about fully supporting 
Labour’s position against fast - track.  For example, Labour’s position and that of the 
AFL - CIO was that “fast-track extension leading to NAFTA would ultimately lead to 
a situation where a sovereign nation seeks to negotiate an agreement that is certain to 
destroy the jobs of tens of thousands of its citizens.”  They added that “the effort 
circumscribes the role of Congress” and “the proposal is harmful to American 
workers.” 105  For  Gephardt however, this view was too much, he noted for example, 
that “I count on a lot of support from union members in my districts,” but in his view 
105 John R Mac Arthur, The Selling of Free Trade” NAFTA, Washington and the Subversion of 
American Democracy, Hill and Wang, 2000, 116.  
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the U.S. was already trading with Mexico and the average U.S. tariff was 4% and 
Mexico about 10% so to look at expanding your export market you would want their 
tariffs to come down, to create labour rights and environmental equity so that 
downward pressure on U.S. wages is reduced.  Hopefully, as Mexican productivity, 
quality and wages rise, you can create new consumer markets for U.S. trade.  
According to Gephardt that was ultimately the direction you want trade to go in. 106   
 
As a result of this view, and the Bush administrations NAFTA aim, a compromise was 
worked out which made a deal for labour and environmental issues but also gave more 
support for fast - track and NAFTA from Gephardt and others.  The main details of the 
compromise included an “escape clause that could act as a stop - gap measure to stem 
the loss of jobs and businesses in any one sector.”  There was a “strict standard for 
rules of origin, to ensure Mexico did not just turn into a cheap - labour export platform 
for Asian companies selling into the U.S.”  They also wanted to slowly phase in the 
agreement in order to keep pressure on Mexico to treat its own people better.  In a 
similar manner Gephardt urged that the wage disparity between the U.S.A. and Mexico 
be addressed and that environmental safeguards be supported that would protect 
against U.S. companies taking advantage of the more lax environmental law 
enforcement in Mexico.  With a compromise worked out, fast track extension became 
a reality for the Bush administration.  Some opposition did continue though, mainly 
from Labour and environmental groups like Global Trade Watch.  Bush was however 
successful in his campaign to extend fast track with 231 to 192 in favour of granting 
106 Gephardt, cited in  John R Mac Arthur, The Selling of Free Trade” NAFTA, Washington and the 
Subversion of American Democracy, Hill and Wang, 2000, 116 - 117. Note that John R Mac Arthur 
interviewed Gephardt and other administration officials in his book on their views on NAFTA. 
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the president his extension.  President Bush now had fast track negotiating authority 
for two years. 107   
 
Thus by bringing new issues into the trade agenda during the fast track debate, Bush’s 
critics and opponents brought forward issues that the Bush administration may not 
have considered otherwise.  As Mayer pointed out, in doing this they transformed the 
domestic politics of NAFTA, and impacted on the direction of the negotiation itself.  
For supportive evidence of these claims, we shall briefly examine three examples.   
 
Domestic Intrusions into NAFTA: 
The following section investigates the involvement of domestic players and factors in 
the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement. It will be illustrated that by 
negotiating agreements and deals the Clinton administration was able to overcome 
opposition to NAFTA’s passage, and therefore conclude an agreement that was more 
satisfactory to domestic players, and gave them a greater involvement than for example 
in Cold War policies.  
 
First the environmental factor will be considered.  Bill Clinton, was elected in 
November 1992, and a new round of negotiations for the NAFTA between Canada, 
the U.S. and Mexico began in 1993. Building on the previous efforts by President 
Bush, in September 1993 President Clinton began negotiating additional agreements on 
the environment and labour in order to overcome formidable congressional opposition 
and address some areas which were deemed to be deficient in the proposed NAFTA.  
107 Frederick W Mayer Interpreting NAFTA, Columbia University Press,  1998, 93. 
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It was during this period that Clinton and his administration embarked on their strategy 
to promote and increase support for NAFTA, while other leading voices in the 
Congress debated, discussed and held hearings on NAFTA and the related side 
agreement that Clinton proposed.  For instance, Senator Patrick Moyihan, Chairman of 
the Senate Finance Committee announced that the committee would hold a series of 
hearings on NAFTA to properly assess and discuss among themselves the merits of the 
treaty and proposed side agreements. 108  As Moyihan stated, “this initial hearing will 
give the Clinton administration the opportunity to make the case for the NAFTA,… 
and I look forward to hearing from Secretary Christopher, Secretary Bentsen and 
Ambassador Kantor concerning how this agreement advances our economic interests, 
while also addressing labour, environmental and related concerns. 109   
 
In committing himself to making these additional agreements for NAFTA, Clinton and 
his administration increased the likelihood of NAFTA gaining enough votes to pass 
into legislation and tackle head on a lot of the concerns made by senior government 
players.  For example, in the area of the environment, a lot of prominent Democrat 
108 NAFTA and related side agreements : hearing before the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate 103rd 
Congress first session on labour, business, agriculture, and environmental issues relating to NAFTA, 
15th 21st 28th September 1993, at www.archive.org/stream/naftarelatedside00unit/ 
 
In the U.S. Congress, committees are permanent standing legislative panels who consider bills, issues, 
and make recommendations accordingly.  They also have oversight responsibilities.  For example, the 
Committee on Finance has extensive oversight powers.  It has authority to investigate, review and 
evaluate existing laws and concerns itself with matters relating to trade, tax, and health.  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Senate_Committee_on_Finance. 
109 NAFTA and related side agreements : hearing before the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate 103rd 
Congress first session on labour, business, agriculture, and environmental issues relating to NAFTA, 
15th 21st 28th September 1993, at www.archive.org/stream/naftarelatedside00unit/, 1. 
Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)
       74 
senators and ‘cue - givers’ warned Clinton and his administration that NAFTA would 
need to address the environmental concerns of Congress in order to stand a chance of 
passage. 110  It is also worth pointing out that of the Democrats supporting NAFTA 
there were two contending sides, those who considered NAFTA as good and the side 
agreements as a bonus, such as Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen.  Or those who saw 
NAFTA as flawed and the side agreements as necessary fixes led by the U.S. Trade 
Representative Mickey Kantor. 111  Some fears by those taking Kantor’s view were 
that more lax environmental standards in Mexico would allow Mexican producers to 
have lower production costs and potentially undercut U.S. producers.   
 
For example, companies in America are bound to certain standards over issues like 
vehicle emissions,  tracking and disposal of hazardous waste and adhering to standards 
to minimize the risk of chemical accidents, to name a few, which are the result of the 
U.S. being a highly developed industrial country.  For a country with a lower standard 
of development such as Mexico however, such operating directives were not very 
developed and not widely applied, so setting up and operating a company and its 
necessary infrastructure along with lower workforce costs was overall much cheaper in 
Mexico than the U.S. 112  Consider the fact for example that when NAFTA was initially 
proposed, DDT - a toxic compound formerly widely used as an insecticide was banned 
in the U.S. but in use by Mexican farmers.  U.S. farmers by comparison had to meet 
110 Frederick W Mayer Interpreting NAFTA, Columbia University Press,  1998, 134. 
See also for example, Martin Crutsinger who points out that a lot of Congressmen were holding back 
from making a decision on NAFTA until side agreements were negotiated, in Martin Crutsinger, 
“Clinton began NAFTA lobbying “ Washington Herald Journal 14th September 1993. 
111 Frederick W Mayer Interpreting NAFTA, Columbia University Press,  1998, 183. 
112 The Trade Forum Website  - www.tradefroum.org 
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the higher costs of developing insecticides which were safer than DDT.   
 
Similarly, to illustrate the lower cost of producing goods in Mexico, John MacArthur 
produced a comparative report of the Swingline stapler factory in Long Island New 
York, which announced in 1997 it was closing to relocate to Nogales, just South of the 
U.S. border in Mexico.  In his comparison MacArthur interviewed workers at the old 
New York factory and new workers at the Nogales plant.  The main point that he finds 
of interest is that on the main factory site there was an absence of a large parking area 
full of cars typical of a U.S. factory.  Most workers arrived on one of the five buses 
which transported the workers, and that there was no obvious relationship between 
factory and town like as so often was the case in the U.S. 113 
 
While interviewing one of the Mexican workers called Maria del Refugio Harrandez, 
he found out she was age 16 and in violation of the company’s minimum age of 18 due 
to lying about her age when taken on.  When asked for proof she simply said she had 
none to provide and signed a form stating she was 18.  Committing a fraud was not a 
deterrent to Maria as with the exception of signing her name she was completely 
illiterate, Maria had only gone to the first Grade for a few months and stated that they 
did not ask such questions when they needed people to work.  Other anecdotes abound 
over the conditions such as she had no holiday in 14 months, no knowledge of sick pay 
entitlement, replying that if someone was off they did not get paid.  While by 
comparison to the factory that closed in Long Island where staplers were produced by 
113 John R Mac Arthur, The Selling of Free Trade” NAFTA, Washington and the Subversion of 
American Democracy, Hill and Wang, 2000, 346. 
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automated assembly line machines, MacArthur found that the same staplers in Nogales 
were put together by hand. 114 
 
There was therefore a danger that due to production methods and conditions in 
Mexico U.S producers would be hurt by lower cost Mexican goods.  This along with a 
need to raise environmental standards meant that in the case of the side agreement 
made on the environment prior to the NAFTA vote, the Clinton administration not 
only consulted environmental organisations, but encouraged them to submit 
suggestions on key issues. The groups that participated ranged from the National 
Wildlife Federation to the World Wildlife Fund, who had approved much of the 
originally proposed NAFTA text. These groups had agreed on a number of objectives:  
 
1 – First, establishing a tri-national environmental commission with broad authority and 
an independent secretariat; 
2 – Second, preserving the integrity of federal and subfederal environmental laws, 
ensuring transparency and public participation in dispute settlement and other 
activities;  
3 – Third, earmarking adequate funds for environmental cleanup, such as through a 
regional development bank allowing access to domestic courts so that private parties 
could seek compensation from individuals and companies rather than governments;  
4 – Finally, imposing trade remedies if inadequate enforcement gave rise to a 
competition of the global commons. 115 
114 Ibid, 354. 
115  G W Grayson, The North American Free Trade Agreement, University Press of American Inc, 
1995, 135. 
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Environmentalists presented their ideas through multiple channels, which indicated the 
increased access and involvement of such groups. For example, they regularly lobbied 
through the Office of the vice-President; the State Department, especially through 
Richard Smith, Counselor Timothy Wirth, the White House’s Office of Environment 
Policy, headed by Katie McGinty, EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner; the National 
Security Council, the USTR; the Office of Senator Max Baucus and other lawmakers. 
116  The result was that following negotiating sessions in Washington in July 1993, the 
Mexicans accepted the U.S. proposal and there was agreement on a fairly detailed 
environmental side deal. This deal established a relatively strong Environmental 
Secretatriat for the NAFTA, an active role for Non- governmental Organisations, the 
ability of non public entities to file complaints, and while largely symbolic, trade 
sanctions were to be introduced as an ultimate penalty for environmental violations. 117   
 
U.S. Democratic Majority leader – Gephardt reportedly stated that sanctions for 
116  Ibid, 137. 
117  In the unlikely event that the subject of a complaint fails to pay its fine or still refuses to enforce 
its environmental law, other remedies will be available.  For example, in a dispute between Mexico 
and the U.S. the complaining party or parties can suspend NAFTA benefits based on the amount of 
the assessment.  Most likely the sanction would involve “snapping back” tariffs to the pre- NAFTA 
levels.  In the case of Canada however, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation at the request 
of the complainant - collects the fine and enforces an action plan in summary proceedings, before a 
Canadian Court of competent jurisdiction.  The dispute settlement procedure also differs between 
Canada and Mexico as Canada would not agree to sanctions in the negotiations enforced by the CEC - 
Cooperation for Environmental Cooperation, but rather fines that would be enforced by the Canadian 
Courts.  
G W Grayson, The North American Free Trade Agreement, University Press of American Inc,  
1995, 143. 
Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)
       78 
environmental violations were a ‘sine qua non’ for approval of the agreement. 118  
Moreover, in March 1992, the Washington journal Inside U.S. Trade published a 
leaked copy of the NAFTA negotiating text. For the first time the environmental 
community that had been outside of the negotiations could see what was going on 
inside. 119  John Audley from the Sierra Club stated the view of many in the 
community: "Its pure and simple, the document does not pay any attention to anything 
but expanding trade. The best you get is meaningless language or no mention of the 
environment. Yet on the sections about environment and health, you get language to 
protect economic activity from environmental standards". 120  For example, the leaked 
NAFTA text created a knock - on effect as environmentalists united across the 
spectrum to demand changes in the text that require that environmental standards be 
maintained or raised. 
 
The environmental groups enlisted the support of Max Baucus, chair of the 
International Trade Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee. In letters to Carla 
Hills and Environmental Protection Agency administrator William Reilly on June 3rd, 
he pressed the environmental groups’ agenda and made clear his determination that 
they be addressed. In the House, Bill Richardson (Democrat –New Mexico) one of the 
leaders of the effort to pass fast track, warned that the agreement would "go down the 
tubes" unless Congressional environmental concerns were met. 121  For example, 
118  Inside U.S. Trade, Aug 13th 1993, 18. 
119  Frederick W Mayer Interpreting NAFTA, Columbia University Press,  1998, 133. 
120  Ibid. 
121  BNA International Environment Daily, Environmental Issues to Decide the Fate of the NAFTA , 
Representative Richardson Predicts, 29th June 1992. 
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various Congressional groups were concerned to prevent Mexico’s lower 
environmental standards giving its manufacturers an “unfair” advantage over U.S. 
producers which is a form of protectionism.  At the same time, there were also real 
lower standards which needed to be raised, and putting production costs in Mexico on 
a similar playing field to the U.S. would be the preferred outcome.   
 
The messages from members of Congress such as Senator Baucus and environmental 
groups got the administration’s attention, as, over the next two months, U.S. 
negotiators would insist on reopening portions of the text to address some of the 
environmentalists’ concerns. For example, the negotiators modified NAFTA’s 
language to shift the burden of proof from demonstrating that a regulation was least 
trade restrictive to demonstrating that there was some legitimate environmental reason 
for the standard. Similarly, in the investment chapter of NAFTA the negotiators added 
in language stating that no country may lower its environmental, health and safety 
standards to attract investment.  
 
Thus the example of the environmental agreement illustrates the involvement and 
influence of several domestic interest groups and other figures in the legislature, as 
well as illustrating the need for the U.S. executive to negotiate a deal that would be 
acceptable with Congress. Furthermore, the U.S. decision to demand side agreements 
on the environment and the parallel agreement in agriculture is best understood in 
terms of both the configuration of interests and the operation of political institutions in 
the U.S. domestic arena. Hence the influence of domestic actors in the U.S. foreign 
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policy making process. 122 
 
A second domestic factor was the issue of “rule of origin” of automobiles.  A lot of the 
negotiations for NAFTA concentrated on the rules of origin that established how much 
of a good needed to be made in North America for it to be considered "North 
American".  That is, how much needed to be made in North America for it to qualify 
for preferential tariff treatment.  In these negotiations it is difficult to explain them as 
an international – level bargain, as to a large extent domestic politics does not only 
constrain the national interest and thus the stance taken by administration officials but 
in many instances it actually defines the national interest.  For example, Mayer points 
this out in his book "Interpreting NAFTA" by considering how the negotiation that 
took place over the automobile rule of origin illustrate this dynamic. 123  In this instance 
the issue was what percentage of a car would need to be North American before the 
car was declared North American.  
 
For example, 62.5% was the eventual decision reached on the percentage of a car that 
needed to be made in North America to be considered North American. This could be 
seen as somewhat reflective of the U.S, Mexican and Canadian preferences for 65%, 
60% and 60% respectively. 124  By taking a closer analysis however, it appears that 
positions taken by the negotiators in the international arena were largely determined by 
122  To put more simply, if the U.S. was just following its national interest in negotiating a side 
agreement it would surely have done this prior to 1993.  Rather it appears that the influence of 
domestic factors in the U.S. policy making process pressed  for changes to make the NAFTA proposal 
more acceptable.  
123  Frederick W Mayer Interpreting NAFTA, Columbia University Press,  1998, 155. 
124  Ibid 
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powerful factions within the domestic arena. That is to say, the U.S. position can be 
explained as the outcome of a domestic –level bargain among strong domestic 
interests. Most salient among these were those of the "Big Three" automakers, - 
General Motors, Ford and Chrystler – and the domestic autoparts makers. All three 
automakers had an interest in a reasonably high rule of origin to make it more difficult 
for European and Japanese competitors to locate assembly plants in Canada and 
Mexico and thus ship finished automobiles to the U.S. duty free.  125   
 
There were differences between the U.S. domestic interests. General Motors differed 
from Ford and Chrystler, in that, due to its joint venture with Izuzu in Canada, General 
Motors favoured a lower rule of origin – around 60%.   Whereas, due to their own 
production patterns Ford and Chrystler preferred a higher rule of around 70%.  That is 
to say because the Ford and Chrystler’s production was based in the U.S. and they 
were keen to gain better access to the Mexican market they were also concerned that 
by phasing out the restrictions too quickly, European and Japanese competitors such as 
Izuzu with manufacturing plants in Canada might get an easy way into the market.  
The makers of autoparts also differed, and strove for as high a percentage as possible 
since high percentages protected them from foreign competitors.   Together these 
different domestic interests agreed to make 65% the U.S. bargaining position. For 
Mexico and Canada however, 60% was the position favoured by both. At the end of 
the negotiations Mexico appeared willing to accept 65% but Canada would not budge, 
so in an attempt to complete the negotiations and make a compromise the halfway 
125  David Everett,  "NAFTA Combatants Roll Out the Big Guns" Knight Ridder/Tribune News 
Service 5th May 1993, 10. 
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figure of 62.5% was agreed upon. 126 Thus, the Auto rule of origin case highlights the 
effect of U.S. private industries in the U.S. policy making process and ultimately 
affecting the international outcome.  
 
The third and final example of the influence of domestic factors in affecting the 
substance of the NAFTA treaty to allow for its passage in the U.S. Congress is the 
changes in the terms of agreement for sugar. In the run up to the final vote on NAFTA 
ratification in the U.S. Congress it was still unclear whether the Clinton administration 
would have enough votes to ratify the agreement. One of the biggest blocks of 
undecided legislators identified by the President and his administration were from 
Florida and Louisiana. In these states approximately 10 Democrats and over 10 
Republicans were holding back on committing themselves either for or against the 
NAFTA agreement depending on whether changes could be made in the terms of 
NAFTA on issues of concern to them: namely, sugar, citrus fruits and vegetables 
which they could not produce easily in winter.  
 
In fact, sugar producers such as Charles Melancon from Louisiana had never been 
happy with NAFTA’s sugar provisions. 127  As Mr Melancon noted, "without the sugar 
problem fixed I think we can kill NAFTA". 128  Other observers concurred. For 
example, Louisiana Democrats William Jefferson and Billy Tauzin were claiming that 
15 – 17 votes in the House depended on the sugar deal. 129  Consequently, in response 
126 Frederick W Mayer Interpreting NAFTA, Columbia University Press,  1998, 156. 
127 Ibid, 316. 
128 Ibid, 317. 
129  Ibid. 
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to the need to secure the votes of people like Jefferson and Tauzin, the United States 
reopened talks on the terms of the sugar agreement in late October 1993 and also 
began talking about citrus fruit. 130   
 
Although the Mexican government had said publicly that it would not re-negotiate 
these issues, the political necessity of more votes being needed by the U.S. to pass the 
NAFTA agreement led to Mexico making some concessions and agreeing to modest 
changes in the sugar, citrus and vegetable deals. For example, in the case of sugar, 
corn sweeteners were to be included in the calculation of Mexican sugar consumption, 
thus making it less likely that Mexico could become a net exporter of sugar. As the 
U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor later pointed out, the sugar, citrus and 
vegetable deals were of great importance as they probably helped the Clinton 
administration secure around 26 votes in the Florida, Louisiana and Southern regions. 
131   
 
Conclusion: 
These, and other aspects of domestic intrusion into the NAFTA foreign - policy 
making process will be revisited in more detail in later chapters.  In the meantime we 
can conclude from the initial evidence provided in this chapter that it is clear, that in 
the case of the ratification of the NAFTA agreement, we must look beyond a 
international system - level explanation as a determinant of U.S. policy. At various 
stages in the process from the influence on a Congressperson’s voting behaviour, to 
130  Ibid. 
131  Mickey Kantor quoted in K,Cooper, “NAFTA Splits Parties, Crossed Political Lines,” Washington 
Post, 18th November 1993, A1. 
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the request for fast – track negotiating authority and the side agreements and deals 
made on issues such as sugar and the environment, the involvement and influence of 
domestic actors in the process is substantial. Indeed, the effect of environmental 
groups and members of Congress acting on behalf of their district’s contributed to 
changes in the actual text of the agreement that was voted in by Congress. This 
evidence is investigated further in the subsequent chapters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.  Investigation of NAFTA 
 
 
Up until now, this study has considered and examined the various theories and stances 
relating to the role of public opinion in American foreign policy.  It has considered the 
general issue of the role of domestic politics in foreign policy, looked at the way 
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separate factors such as the media, the Congress and public opinion have made an 
impact upon foreign policy.  In addition it has considered the marked difference 
between foreign policy making in the post - cold war to the pre - 9/11 era and that of 
the earlier cold war years.  The findings have thus far indicated that the role of public 
opinion may be more significant than a number of studies would suggest, and that in 
the particular circumstances of the 1994 - 1997 period U.S. foreign policy experienced 
a situation where it was more open and accessible to public opinion.   
 
While many studies consider public opinion in relation to policy and whether or not 
public opinion corresponds with the policy, by looking more in depth we can find in the 
case of NAFTA that policy often results from a Congressman’s perceived perception 
of how public opinion rating will fall as a result of a policy, as well as responding by 
making changes to the policy in order to win the support of various constituencies 
through the way policy would affect them, this makes foreign policy making more like 
domestic policy making.  The relationship between policy and opinion has long been 
thought of as a top - down process, with public attitudes easily manipulated by elites.  
In fact, however, the American people maintain coherent if very general foreign policy 
beliefs which affect their evaluations of policies and policy - makers alike and 
undermine the leader - driven, top - down process.  “The nexus between policy and 
opinion is therefore better conceptualized as reciprocal”. 132  Furthermore, the fact that 
an overwhelming proportion of foreign policy officials accept the desirability or 
necessity of shaping and responding to the public opinion environment tells us that 
external opinion is a matter of continuing concern to officials.   
132 Eugene R Wittkopf , Faces of internationalism, Duke University Press, 1990, 99. 
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So how does the case of the ratification of NAFTA and NAFTA expansion lend itself 
to the hypothesis that during the period 1991 - 1997 public opinion in America played 
a more pronounced and somewhat involved influence on U.S. foreign policy?  We have 
already seen some impact when considering the need for side deals, now we shall 
discuss the case of NAFTA ratification in more detail and among other things, detail 
and assess the impact of these side deals.  The case of NAFTA expansion will be 
considered in the following chapter.   
 
In the early to mid -1990s, with the end of the Cold War, the overriding goals and 
priorities of U.S. foreign policy became more diffuse and numerous.  Many parts of the 
U.S. economy were sensitive to change after the post-Cold War disruption and the 
ever - looming threat of cheaper goods flooding the country and destroying U.S. jobs.  
As mentioned previously, there was opposition to NAFTA from industries that would 
lose in free competition with low cost Mexican producers, such as manufacturers of 
glass and brooms and farmers threatened by cheap imports.  Similarly, organised 
labour, who felt threatened by potential competition from cheaper Mexican labour 
opposed extension of fast track. 133 Opposition also emerged from groups and 
organisations who were newcomers to the politics of trade, such as those concerned 
about the environment, food safety, workers rights, and human rights.  All these 
groups contributed to a new kind of involvement by domestic actors on a trade 
agreement, and led to the unnerving of a number of Congressional members who 
became anxious about  how the issue of NAFTA would be received by their 
133 Frederick W Mayer Interpreting NAFTA, Columbia University Press,  1998, 68. 
Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)
       87 
constituents. 134  
 
So how did the public’s reaction and views on NAFTA affect the votes and stances of 
members of Congress on the ratification of NAFTA?  This question is answered below 
with reference to first of all the changing stances of various congressmen on the 
NAFTA vote and the factors they give as being the most important considerations 
affecting their vote.  The second and concluding batch of evidence provided in 
response to this question centres on illustrating how by negotiating agreements and 
deals, the Clinton administration was able to overcome opposition to NAFTA’s 
passage, and therefore conclude an agreement that was more satisfactory to domestic 
players.  In addition, in the concluding chapter of this study additional evidence will be 
tied in to show how these actions and ways of getting involved gave domestic actors 
more say in foreign policy making that they had had during the Cold War.  This can 
especially be highlighted by making comparisons with the earlier agreements on trade 
between the U.S. and Canada and the U.S. and Caribbean nations in the 1980s.   
 
Factors affecting Congressmen’s votes on NAFTA:   
When considering the ways in which public opinion impacted on the ratification of 
NAFTA and the debate that had preceded this vote, it is helpful to outline and 
understand the contours of where the public’s views lay on this issue.  With the vote 
on the NAFTA agreement scheduled for November 17th 1993, in August 1993 
President Clinton embarked on a serious campaign effort to increase support for 
134 Indeed, this ties in with the trend where economic and foreign economic policy is becoming a more 
salient domestic issue - with trends such as globalisation. 
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NAFTA.  Clinton’s pro - NAFTA strategy began in earnest in August 1993 and was 
headed by Bill Daley, son of the former Chicago Mayor Richard Daley.  For the 
NAFTA strategists, the first task was to assess the situation in Congress after the 
August recess.  In doing this, the administrations pro - NAFTA strategists found that 
the ultimate problem was not really in Congress, rather it lay with the tremendous 
pressure Congress members were feeling from outside political forces. 135  
 
As Representative David L Hobson (a Republican from Ohio) pointed out, “people 
came back to Washington saying they had received a tremendous amount of anti - 
NAFTA sentiment, with mail in every Congressional office running strongly against the 
agreement. 136 For example, Labour Unions, who were the largest campaign 
contributors for many Democrats were angrily opposed.  The forty - member Black 
caucus had taken a formal stand against NAFTA.  Similarly, other Democrats had had 
problems, especially those with strong agricultural constituencies such as Florida, 
Louisiana and California, where sugar, citrus and vegetable growers were likely to face 
competition from Mexican imports.  For a lot of constituencies in America fears about 
NAFTA surrounded the issues highlighted by Ross Perot.  That is, jobs would be lost 
as production moved to Mexico which had lower labour and environmental costs and 
where companies would therefore be able to increase their profits.    
 
Indeed, general public opinion in America on the NAFTA issue had also appeared to 
have swung strongly to an anti - NAFTA stance.  This was evident from a number of 
135  Frederick W Mayer Interpreting NAFTA, Columbia University Press,  1998, 273. 
136  Ibid, 283. 
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polls taken in the Autumn of 1993.  For example, the NBC - Wall Street Journal poll in 
September showed that only 25% of the American public favoured NAFTA whereas 
36% opposed it.  Similarly, in a Gallup, CNN, USA Today poll a month earlier in 
August 1993, the findings again indicated that only 26% of Americans favoured the 
NAFTA agreement with 64% opposed. 137  
 
Moreover, news agencies such as the Tribune News Service also found that in town 
meetings in Californian and rallies in Michigan and in T.V. call -in shows, the American 
public was overwhelmingly becoming involved in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and turning it into a populist issue “argued by voters and politicians with as 
much fervour as health care reform and deficit reduction.”  138   
 
In fact, a poll in October 1993 by the Times Mirror Centre for the People and the Press 
found that half of all Americans had followed the debate about NAFTA “very or fairly 
closely.” 139 In essence, with events such as  the shutting down of five auto parts 
companies factories and then the laying off of half of the workforce of Toledo’s 
biggest glassmaker, and the relocation of these jobs to Mexico, Americans understood 
that trade affects their jobs and standards of living.  Indeed, the closure of the 
Swingline plant in Long Island New York was also keenly felt in that community.  
Later, Department of Labour statistics estimated that around 214 000 lay offs in U.S. 
137   AEI Studies in Public Opinion, Polls on NAFTA: A 10 year Review, Released December 2003, 
compiled by Karlyn H Bowman, Todd J Weiner, Krista Schmitt and Elena Lipson,.  The report was 
on the American Enterprise Institute Website, December 2003, p.3. 
138   Knight Ridder Tribune News Service, 12th November 1993. 
139   Knight Ridder Tribune News Service 14th September 1993. 
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factories were due to jobs transferred to Mexico between 1994 - 1998.  Yet, while jobs 
were also created in the U.S. as a result of NAFTA, factory closures have a large 
impact in a community and can impact on the public opinion of that region. 140  For 
example, opponents pointed out that while a lot of the workers of displaced jobs were 
reallocated to other jobs in different sectors, a lot of these were in the service industry 
which pays wages that are only four - fifths of that of a job in the manufacturing sector. 
141  Of similar importance, every member of Congress understood that all 435 districts 
are affected by trade. 142  
 
This increased involvement and recognition of the need to engage with the NAFTA 
issue by the U.S. public and Congress members fits with the finding in the previous 
chapter that according to democratic theory the administration’s foreign policy should 
consider the views of the people, but does it also meet the further finding that public 
opinion should set the outer limits of what it views as an acceptable policy?  Indeed the 
hypothesis put forward here, and the evidence from NAFTA ratification suggests that 
it does.   
 
Firstly, in order for NAFTA to pass, the administration needed to garner enough 
support in Congress and in order to do this members of Congress had to vote in a 
140 See Juan Gonzalez, Harvest of Empire: A History of Latinos in America Viking Penguin, 2000, 
244. See also John R Mac Arthur, The Selling of Free Trade” NAFTA, Washington and the 
Subversion of American Democracy, Hill and Wang, 2000, 19. 
141 Robert E Scott, The High Price of Free Trade, Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper 17th 
November 2003, 147 www.epi.org. 
142 Timothy Bennett, former trade official quoted in Knight Ridder News Service, 14th September 
1993. 
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manner consistent with their constituents.  In order to illustrate this, it is proposed here 
that with the negotiation of side agreements the Clinton administration in August 1993 
and its subsequent campaign to highlight the benefits associated with the NAFTA as a 
result of the side agreements, struck a balance for NAFTA  that was more acceptable 
to the public and thus garnered more support.  As a result members of Congress who 
had previously opposed NAFTA were able to come out in support.  This was evident 
from the statements presented in Congress by an unusually large number - 293 
members - in which they outlined the reasons for their votes.  For example, in a Senate 
press conference on September 20th 1993, two previously undecided Senators, Jeff 
Bingham (Democrat - New Mexico) and Harlan Matthews (Democrat - Tennessee), 
publicly announced their endorsement of NAFTA.  Senator Bingaman for one, stated 
that “the NAFTA process provides us with an excellent opportunity to identify 
resources for addressing the state of the Rio Grande and other pressing environmental 
and health issues along the border.” 143 Senator Mathews also called NAFTA “an 
opportunity to become more prosperous and secure by becoming more productive and 
competitive.” 144  
 
Similarly, in a special lengthened op-ed article in the Washington Post on September 
19th 1993, on NAFTA, subtitled “How I Overcame my Doubts and Learned to Like the 
Pact,” the former Reagan Administration trade official Clyde Prestowitz reversed his 
position, writing that at one time he had great concerns, “I believe the time has now 
come for Congress to ratify NAFTA.”  “Under the terms of NAFTA,” Prestowitz 
143  NAFTA Notes, Monday  20th September 1993, www.ibiblio.org. 
144  Ibid.  
Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)
       92 
wrote, “we are giving away very little.  The barriers being removed are mostly on the 
Mexican side.  Ironically, their removal may actually reduce incentives for U.S. firms 
to move South.”  145 
 
Again, in a House press conference on September 21st 1993, the House Speaker 
Thomas Foley was joined by members Vic Fazio (Democrat - California), Vice - Chair 
of the House Democratic Caucus and Chair of the Democratic Congressional 
Campaign Committee, and Freshman Rep. Jay Inslee (Democrat - Wyoming) to 
publicly endorse NAFTA.  In voicing his support Fazio said, “California stands to gain 
30,000 to 40,000 jobs over the next two years, and the country gains 200,000 jobs 
after the enactment of NAFTA.” 146 Arguing that NAFTA was a “unique” opportunity 
for the U.S., Fazio said, “if we don’t take it, if we allow others like the Japanese and 
Europeans to perhaps gain more economic growth opportunities they will be able to 
cement their own trading blocks together, we should support NAFTA and give 
ourselves an opportunity for the long haul, for the future.” 147 Even Rep. Richard 
Gephardt who opposed NAFTA conceded that the administration had made “important 
progress” in certain areas such as having minimum wages, child labour, and health and 
safety covered under the dispute settlement system, as well as Mexico’s unilateral 
pledge to tie minimum wages to productivity.” 148 
 
These statements go some way to illustrate the intense feelings raised by the issue of 
145  Ibid. 
146  NAFTA Notes, Tuesday 21st September 1993, www.ibiblio.org 
147  Ibid.  
148  Ibid. 
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NAFTA between August - November 1993 and were part of a large movement by a 
huge number of Congressmen to make statements justifying why they were either 
voting for or against the agreement.  In fact, when related to the public’s feelings from 
the opinion polls between August - November 1993 the shift in Congress support 
correlates well with the public.  For example, the public were initially more opposed to 
NAFTA but moved to being more evenly divided and then more supportive by 
November 1993.  The shift can be documented by some polls, such as the Wall Street 
Journal/NBC poll from September 1993 which showed that those opposing NAFTA 
outnumbered those supporting NAFTA by 36% -25%. 149  After President Clinton had 
announced in late September that he was to sign the side agreements however, support 
for NAFTA increased to 42%. 150 Similarly, in the Congress the division in opinion 
shifted from having a majority opposed to NAFTA, then moving to be more evenly 
split, to eventually  gathering enough support to pass the agreement.   
 
In addition, as an example of how the interests and views of constituents were 
affecting Congress members, Representative Howard Berman (Democrat - California) 
made the following statement in support of NAFTA: “I have concluded that passing 
NAFTA is in the best interest of advancing my intense commitment to creating new, 
high - wage manufacturing jobs in Southern California.” 151 He further pointed out that 
manufacturing jobs “have been the engine of upward mobility for hundreds of millions 
of Americans, and I am convinced NAFTA is the route to restoring manufacturing jobs 
149   NAFTA Notes, Friday 1st October 1993, www.ibiblio.org/whitehouse-papers. 
150   R E Baldwin C S Magee, Congressional Trade Votes From Nafta Approval to Fast Track Defeat, 
Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C. 2000, 9. 
151   NAFTA Notes, Friday 1st October  1993, www.ibiblio.org. 
Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)
       94 
in my state.” 152 
 
As a penultimate example of the impact constituents had on members of Congress in 
the NAFTA debate, it was mentioned above that 293 House members presented brief 
statements on the floor before the final vote in which they outlined the reasons for their 
votes.  In doing so, the main reason given by the 177 members planning to vote for and 
the 116 members planning to vote against approval of NAFTA, was the perceived 
impact of NAFTA on jobs and wages. 153 Again, this highlights the importance the 
NAFTA issue and its perceived impact in a particular district had in affecting a 
Congressman’s vote.   
 
Finally, in the case of the Congressional delegate from Florida, the impact of 
constituents concerns and jobs seemed to impact Clinton’s decision to make a deal 
about tomato production, and as a result win Florida’s 25 congressional votes.  Indeed, 
tomato growing farmers had been putting pressure on the Clinton administration to set 
a quota for the amount of tomato’s that could be imported into the U.S. to prevent 
tomato’s being “dumped” in the U.S. at less than their cost of production and thus 
threatening the welfare of U.S. tomato growers. 154  To make this deal, Clinton’s 
NAFTA campaign director Bill Daley, his U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, 
his Director of Congressional Affairs Howard Pastor, U.S.T.R.‘s Congressional Affairs 
liason Nancy Leamond, Kantor’s Chief of Staff’s Tom Nides and the deputy Director 
152   Ibid. 
153   R E Baldwin C S Magee, Congressional Trade Votes From Nafta Approval to Fast Track Defeat, 
Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C. 2000, 9. 
154 The U.S. relies on tomato imports in the winter months when they are not easily produced at home. 
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of Congressional Affairs Susan Brophy, arranged meetings, phonecalls, lunches, 
dinners and general contact between the president and congressional lawmakers.  This 
was to make sure the President could try and gain their support, communicate his 
intentions and respond to the concerns of Congressmen.  Moreover, Clinton’s team of 
advisors made sure Clinton knew the points to emphasise and the themes of concern 
when he spoke with a particular Congressman or Senator.   
 
Pastor, the President’s Director for Congressional Affairs also made sure that the 
President would focus on Congressmen who would more likely support NAFTA if 
they could be given some extra assurance or assistance with matters of concern in their 
districts.  In fact, it is estimated by Grayson that Kantor, (also part of Clinton’s team) 
met with “dozens of legislators” and at least 50 undecided Democrats to discuss 
concerns about the proposed NAFTA, and the types of assurance, like the tomato deal 
noted above, which could secure their support. 155  Governor Lawton Chiles along 
with 23 of the Florida delegates for example, made it clear that they would be more 
supportive of NAFTA so long as more protection was given to the important citrus 
and sugar industries in Florida. 156  This was evident from data at the National 
Governors Association Winter meeting from Jan 31st - Feb 2nd 1993 which was 
attended by 50 governors as well as committee members and other guests including 
President Bill Clinton, Senate majority leader George Mitchell and the minority leader 
Bob Dole.  A number of subjects were discussed at the meeting and as a result policy 
155 G W Grayson, The North American Free Trade Agreement, University Press of American Inc,  
 1995, 202. 
156 G W Grayson, The North American Free Trade Agreement, University Press of American Inc,  
 1995, 203.  
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positions were adopted, one of which was “continuing support for the NAFTA so long 
as environmental concerns and job security were addressed. 157 
 
NAFTA ratification: 
In the aftermath of the NAFTA however, many commentators claimed that public 
opinion was disregarded in favour of big business and commercial interests who aimed 
to bring about more favourable trading conditions.  For U.S. producers of minivans for 
example, prior to NAFTA, it was most logical for them to export the excess 
production of their Mexican plants back to the U.S.  With passage of NAFTA 
however, U.S. minivan producers could shift their minivan production back to more 
efficient U.S. plants. 158  Yet in many cases it was claimed that NAFTA would favour 
business while costing the U.S. public jobs.   
 
For example, one of the most vocal critics of the Clinton administration’s NAFTA 
proposal in disregarding the welfare and views of Americans was Ross Perot.  For 
Perot, the core problem with NAFTA, and one which many American workers were 
aware of, was that by implementing NAFTA an agreement with Mexico “where they 
pay people $1 an hour, have no health care, no retirement, no pollution controls etc, 
you are going to hear a giant sucking sound of jobs being pulled out of this country.” 
159  Yet by looking at much polling data from various sources such as Gallup, CBS, 
Cable News Network News and the prestigious American newspapers it is apparent 
that public opinion and points the public highlighted as important were taken into 
157 www.nga.org/portal/site/nga 
158 NAFTA Notes, White House Papers, www.ibiblio.org  20th September 1993, 1. 
159  Frederick W Mayer Interpreting NAFTA, Columbia University Press,  1998, 228. 
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consideration in the final version of NAFTA passed by Congress.   
 
Firstly, with regard to trade, polling questions posed between 1992 - 2003 indicated a 
two - mindedness by Americans on the issue of trade.  For example, a question asked 
by Yankelovich, Time and CNN in March 1993 found 76% agreeing that past 
international trade agreements had caused a loss of jobs in the U.S.. 160  While another 
question posed by Princeton Survey Research Associates and Newsweek interviewers 
in the Summer of 1993 found an identical 76% saying that international trade is a good 
thing for the U.S..  This indicates that Americans want to protect the jobs of workers 
but at the same time believe that free trade creates more choices, cheaper goods and 
makes American industry more competitive.  This two - mindedness was evident in 
polls regarding American’s opinions on NAFTA, and was also reflected in the 
subsequent debate.  It is also apparent though, that with regard to claims that the 
Clinton administration was disregarding public views in favour of those of businesses, 
there was a larger majority of Americans in support compared to those opposed even 
up to two years before the public debate in 1993.   
 
For example a December 1991 Roper Poll asking respondents whether they were 
generally in favour of or opposed to a North American Free Trade Agreement 
involving the U.S., Canada and Mexico, recorded 47% generally in favour 12% 
opposed and 25% responding ‘don’t know’. 161  Similarly, in polls recorded by 
Yankelovich/Time/CNN in July and August 1992, the percentage of respondents 
160  See figures at www.ropercenter.edu.  
161   Figures available at www.ropercemter.edu. 
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favouring the free trade agreement between the U.S., Mexico and Canada that would 
eliminate all trade barriers were 45% in favour, 39% opposed 16% not sure and 45% 
in favour, 38% opposed and 17% not sure respectively. 162   
 
Another poll by the Princeton Survey Research Associates and Times - Mirror 
organization also indicated larger amounts of the public favouring NAFTA in 
September and December 1993 where 42% were in support, 37% opposed, 21% 
responding ‘don’t know’ and 52% in favour, 33% opposed and 15% responding ‘don’t 
know’ respectively. 163  
 
Secondly, the side agreements negotiated by President Clinton prior to the approval of 
NAFTA by the U.S. Congress also point to the influence of the public.  For example, 
side agreements such as those on the environment, agriculture and automobile 
industries discussed in Chapter Four were arranged to minimise the effect of NAFTA 
on various domestic producers, to address environmental concerns and to minimise the 
discrepancies in conditions between the U.S. and Mexico.  As a result, during the 
negotiation of the side agreements and the public debate surrounding N.A.F.T.A. in 
August - September 1993, the public shifted their support to more than 50%.  For 
example, in polls taken in December 1993 from three separate organisation, NBC, 
Harris and Gallup, the public gave 53%, 51% and 53% in support of NAFTA.  This 
indicates that as the  Clinton administration addressed public concerns regarding the 
loss of jobs and other concerns and the public in turn responded by being more 
162   Polls available at cnn.com. 
163   See www.princeton.edu for polling evidence. 
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supportive.   
 
Thus, in the case of the ratification of NAFTA, the effect of public opinion falls in line 
with the evidence presented earlier by indicating that the limits set by the public was 
that a majority supported a NAFTA but there were issues of concern to them which 
President Clinton heeded as he negotiated the side agreements.  In addition, again 
indicating the influence of the public and their constituents in the NAFTA debate, an 
unusually large number of House members - 293 - presented brief statements on the 
floor prior to the vote outlining the reasons for their votes.  With the perceived impact 
of NAFTA on jobs and wages being the main consideration influencing the voting 
behaviour of both members voting for and of members voting against the bill.   
 
Thus from the evidence presented here, the study of the NAFTA agreement case 
appears to support the hypothesis of the important role played by public opinion in the 
foreign policy process in the period after the end of the Cold War.  That is, where 
public opinion sets the permissible limits or opinion “dikes” of salient policies, and 
policy - makers are typically respectful of the prevailing climate of opinion as they 
want to avert electoral punishment and declining popularity.  Although it is not the 
contention here that public opinion was the sole determinant of the NAFTA ratification 
policy it did have significant impact. 164  The case of NAFTA expansion will be 
considered in the following Chapter.   
 
 
164   For example, external economic influences in Mexico were also important. 
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6.  The Case of NAFTA Expansion and the Fast Track Proposal 
 
 
Turning to the case of NAFTA expansion in 1997, public opinion was also significant 
in at least three ways.  Firstly, it constrained the administration from pursuing an 
ambitious expansion plan for NAFTA, instead it argued for expansion which would 
only have moderate impact (as that was more likely to be acceptable with the public).  
Secondly, it illustrates  how the lack of public support impacted on the votes of 
Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)
       101 
Congress, which did not pass the fast - track which was required by the administration 
to pursue the expansion of NAFTA.  Thirdly, as was the case with the NAFTA 
ratification vote, the proposed expansion of NAFTA also involved a wide spectrum of 
domestic interests and actors, pointing to an increased involvement for domestic 
groups.  This also lead to a greater level of involvement by Congress and both 
reflected and stimulated the increased public awareness over this foreign policy issue.  
As a result, the foreign policy process proved difficult for President Clinton to control. 
165 
 
Indeed, according to a study by Baldwin and Magee, the most important explanation 
for the very different outcome of the 1998 vote in the House of Representatives for the 
granting of the fast -track necessary for NAFTA expansion compared to the 1993 vote 
on NAFTA seemed to be the concerns of Congressmen.  More specifically, Baldwin 
and Magee provide data to indicate the factors which members of Congress claimed 
affected their vote on the fast - track.  Of most concern were the adverse economic 
effects of trade liberalisation on constituents who are less educated and who are 
employed in net import industries. 166  Since the desire to be re - elected makes 
legislators sensitive to voter preference, this increased concern is presumably a 
response to political pressures from these groups of constituents and others who share 
their views. 167   
 
165 James M Scott, After the End, Duke University Press, 1998, 358. 
166  R E Baldwin C S Magee, Congressional Trade Votes From Nafta Approval to Fast Track Defeat, 
Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C. 2000, 39. 
167   Ibid, 38. 
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Again, in this case it appears that the public set the limits of an acceptable policy, in 
terms that it was not supportive of an expansion of  NAFTA  due to concerns over the 
economic effects, similar to those highlighted in the debate over NAFTA in 1993.  As a 
result, with the failure of Congress to pass the fast -track bill required to move ahead 
with the expansion policy, President Clinton decided to put off the proposed 
expansion.  How this came about we must now consider in more detail.   
 
So, this chapter continues with the themes put forward in this study, relating to the role 
of public opinion in American foreign policy.  To restate the case thus far, the findings 
here have illustrated that the role of public opinion may be more significant than in 
previous periods of American foreign policy, and that in the particular circumstances of 
the 1991 -1997 period, U.S. foreign policy experienced a situation where it was more 
open and accessible to public opinion.  In the previous Chapter, it was shown how in 
the case of NAFTA, the role and influence of the public and other domestic actors was 
greater than in the Cold War, and was also positive in support of NAFTA.  For the 
case of the 1997/98 Fast - Track proposal examined in this Chapter, it will be 
illustrated that there is also a greater involvement by domestic constituencies, but in 
this case the influence is negative and did not support the fast track policy.  In both 
cases public and congressional opinion appear to set parameters of possibility rather 
than dictate final policy outcomes.   
 
Thus, in order to illustrate the effect of domestic factors in U.S. foreign policy in the 
case of the attempt to secure fast - track and an expansion of the NAFTA to include 
Chile, it is necessary to, describe the background and provide an explanation of the fast 
- track proposal in 1997/1998.  Secondly, discuss how the attempt to pass fast - track 
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in 1997 was postponed due to the lack of sufficient support from domestic actors and 
ultimately a majority of Congress members.  And, thirdly explain how the second 
attempt to pass fast - track in 1998 was again thwarted by members of Congress.  This 
will enable a determination of the effect and influence of domestic factors in this case.   
 
In order to facilitate this discussion, it might be as well to re-visit the fast - track 
provision and explain why it is important?  Up until the Trade Act of 1974 was passed, 
any trade agreements that America made with other countries concerning the reduction 
of tariffs, did not require congressional approval before becoming legally binding.  The 
1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and its various extensions delegated powers to 
the Executive Branch to negotiate tariff reductions within limits set by Congress 
without the need for Congressional ratification on the individual agreements.  With the 
1974 Trade Act however, the rules changed and Congressional approval was now 
required for all agreements.  It was required that Congress vote on an up - or - down 
basis, without the possibility of amendments and within 60 days of the president 
submitting the implementing bill.  This requirement was known as ‘fast - track,’ and 
fast track authority was continually granted to U.S. Presidents from 1974 - 1993.  Fast 
track involves three elements, (1) consultation and coordination with Congress during 
the negotiation process, (2) a vote on implementing legislation within a fixed period of 
time, and (3) a vote on the entire bill with no amendments. 168 In addition, fast track 
enables the President to negotiate a trade agreement confident that the agreement will 
be voted on as a whole without amendments relating to specific items.  Thus, the other 
country would not have to negotiate with 535 people in addition to the person with 
168   “What is fast track?” www.whitehouse.gov/Initiatives/FastTrack 
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whom they made the agreement. 169  
 
During the 19 years between 1974 - 1993 when U.S. presidents enjoyed having a fast - 
track negotiating authority, major agreements such as the NAFTA and CUFTA were 
passed, and allowed America to reduce barriers to trade.  The Clinton administration 
was granted a 10 - month extension to fast - track in 1993, but was unable to get any 
further extension. 170 Securing a fast - track extension was deemed by Clinton as 
necessary to explore the possibility of making further trade agreements, such as 
expanding NAFTA to include Chile, or other countries.  As it was his aim to negotiate  
more trade deals and open more markets for American goods and services Clinton 
asked Congress to grant him fast - track.   
 
As mentioned, by being granted ‘fast track’ authority the president would be free to 
negotiate trade without fear that Congress would re-open those agreements later and 
make amendments.  According to officials from the Clinton administration, fast - track 
authority was needed so that they could have the credibility and flexibility they need to 
succeed at the negotiating table.  Indeed, President Clinton himself stated that without 
fast - track authority there will be more scope for competitors to break down trade 
barriers for their own products at America’s expense.  To illustrate this, Clinton 
pointed out that since 1992, America’s competitors in Latin America and Asia alone, 
169   From the President’s remarks at AFL-CIO Convention, “What is Fast Track?” 
www.whitehouse.gov/Inititiatives/FastTrack 
170  C Dougherty, “Tough Fight Seen for ’Fast - Track’ Trade” The Washington Post, 22nd September 
2000, 4. 
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have negotiated over 20 agreements that did not include the U.S. 171 
 
 
According to Representative Jim Kolbe (Republican) Arizona, the President can 
negotiate without fast - track authority, but what happens is that a proposal gets 
picked apart in Congress with amendments and so forth until there is no agreement. 172 
Those who make agreement with the U.S. want to know that when the deal is done it 
is either approved or not approved by Congress and not subject to Congressional 
amendment.  So the President needs to have fast - track authority, or there is a danger 
that other countries will not enter into serious trade negotiations with the U.S.   
 
However, like the NAFTA agreement, Clinton’s proposal for an extension of fast - 
track was met with opposition from groups such as those concerned with labour or the 
environment.  These groups mainly opposed Clinton on the grounds that agreements 
such as NAFTA and other trade agreements neglected to raise both wages and 
environmental safeguards of other countries to levels more in line with the U.S. 173 So 
in the case of the 1997/1998 proposal for fast track and NAFTA expansion, how did it 
turn out that President Clinton’s proposals for fast - track authority were defeated?  
Moreover, and of most significance in this study, what was the effect of domestic 
actors on the fast track request?   
 
171  Ibid.  
172  J Barrett, J Ostroff, “Clinton presents fast - track request to Congress” Knight - Ridder Tribune 
News Service, 17th September 1997, 1. 
173 J Lobe, “Clinton Faces Uphill Battle for Fast Track Approval”, U S Trade, 4th December 1997, 11. 
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Despite the successful adoption of NAFTA as a result of Clinton mounting a huge 
publicity campaign and negotiating deals and other arrangements with a host of 
domestic actors, success was not repeated in the case of the fast - track of 1997-1998.  
To set the scene, President Clinton first sent a request for fast - track in 1997, but 
shortly following his proposal the legislation was withdrawn on November 10th as 
Clinton had failed to get enough support in Congress.  House Republican leaders such 
as Newt Gingrich along with President Clinton agreed to postpone a vote on the fast 
track issue until 1998.  At this time the House of Representatives was controlled by the 
Republican Party, yet the main opposition to approving fast - track came from 
President Clinton’s own Democratic Party. 174 
  
To show how factors opposing fast - track and the influence of domestic factors 
prevented it from getting passed, consideration here is given firstly, to the role of 
members of Congress and the influence of their constituencies.  Second, to the role of 
public opinion.  And, third to the part played by special interest groups such as those 
representing labour and the environment. 
 
The role of Congress and constituency influence: 
Taking first, the role of Congressional members and constituency influence.  In this 
realm Clinton faced some serious obstacles.  For example, the new composition of 
Congress was such that it became a factor in putting a lot of Congressional members in 
opposition to fast track.  Indeed, one study conducted by Baldwin and Magee 
illustrates that if the split in Congress had been the same as it was during the 1993 
174  Associated Press, Press Release, November 10th 1997, www.ap.org. 
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NAFTA vote, fast - track would not have met such serious opposition. 175 The change 
in composition however, led to Congress becoming a major factor against the fast - 
track vote.   
 
For example, the make - up of the political parties elected into Congress changed 
substantially between the NAFTA vote in 1993 and the fast - track vote in 1998.  The 
Republican party was now in control of the House and this stood in contrast to the 
Democratic administration.  As Baldwin and Magee show in their analysis of 
Congressional votes during this period, while only 40% of House members were 
Republican at the time of the NAFTA vote, 52% were Republicans when the 1998 fast 
- track vote was taken. 176 Since a higher proportion of Republicans (75%) than 
Democrats (40%) voted for NAFTA in 1993, the 1998  fast - track bill would have 
passed with relative ease if these voting proportions had remained constant as the 
House shifted to a Republican majority.  The proportion of Republicans voting for fast 
- track in 1998 however slipped to 68% and the proportion of Democrats favouring 
the bill dropped to 14%.  Consequently, only 41% of House members voted to give 
fast track authority to the president in 1998. 177   
 
In this respect, some studies have even contended that the 1998 vote for the fast - 
track necessary for the expansion of NAFTA compared to the 1993 vote on NAFTA 
came down to the stance taken by Congressmen. 178  Or indeed, the concerns of 
175  J Barrett, J Ostroff, “Clinton presents fast - track request to Congress” Knight - Ridder Tribune 
News Service, 17th September 1997, 2. 
176 R E Baldwin C S Magee, Congressional Trade Votes From Nafta Approval to Fast Track Defeat, 
Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C. 2000, 33. 
177 Ibid.  
178 Ibid, 38. 
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members of Congress in the House of Representatives.  For example, several have 
since claimed that the way they voted on the fast - track was impinged upon by the 
adverse economic effects of the trade deal for their constituents, such as those who are 
less educated and employed in net import industries. 179  As such, Congressmen tend to 
be sensitive to voters preferences and views due to the need for their own re - election.   
 
This increased concern by Congressmen is presumably a response to political pressures 
from these groups of constituents and others.  For example, Congress member 
Charlene Barshefsky pointed out that she thought that in the case of the 1998 fast - 
track debate members indeed tended to vote on the basis of districts and concerns in 
their districts.180 Charlene Barshefsky highlighted that it is often local politics that are 
determinative of  a vote, and in this case that was acutely so due to the underlying 
sense of anxiety and insecurity among workers.  As she pointed out, at the end of the 
day members tried to do their best to assess the feelings and the pulse of their 
districts.181  In fact, in the Queens district of New York where the Swingline staple 
factory shut down and had a large amount of unemployment as a result, the 
Representative for that district - Gregory Meeks no doubt had constituents interests as 
a priority when he voted against fast - track in 1997. 182   
 
The sense of anxiety and insecurity mentioned by Barshefsky alludes to anti - NAFTA 
179 Ibid.  
180  J Lobe, “Clinton Faces Uphill Battle for Fast Track Approval”, U S Trade, 4th December 1997, 14. 
181  Ibid.  
182 www.congressmangregorymeeks.com   Gregory Meeks voted “no” to establish negotiating 
objectives for trade agreements between the U.S. and other countries and to renew “fast track” 
authority for the President on  25th  September 1998. 
Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)
       109 
sentiment which was evident in 1997 among a number of Congress members who had 
voted for NAFTA but had not yet seen what they were promised by the administration.  
In fact, a substantial number of Congress members were not supportive of extending 
fast - track due to a general unhappiness with the earlier 1993 NAFTA agreement. 183 
Consider for example one of the most frequently recounted illustrations of the 1993 
NAFTA agreement which had reduced the number of tomato growers in the state of 
Florida notwithstanding the special arrangements Clinton had negotiated, from 200 in 
1993 to around 85 in 1998. 184 This had come about primarily from cheap Mexican 
tomatoes crowding the Florida growers out of the market while the Clinton 
administration was negligent in making provisions in reaction to this.  For example, 
Lori Wallach, director of the interest group Public Citizen Global Trade Watch noted 
that even farmers in parts of the country further away such as Idaho knew about the 
situation of “tomatos in Florida” and the large number of tomato growers who had 
been wiped out of business there. 185  
 
In addition, seven out of the ten Democratic members of Congress for the State of 
Michigan said they opposed fast - track due to their concern about the potential loss of 
jobs in the United States and looser food standards in other countries that may have 
contributed to tainted strawberries that sickened nearly 200 Michigan School Children. 
183 J Lobe, “Clinton Faces Uphill Battle for Fast Track Approval”, U S Trade, 4th December 1997, 15. 
184  D Kucinich, “News Conference Announcing Bipartisan Coalition opposed to Fast Track Trade 
Authority” Washington Transcript Service, 22nd October 1997, 5. 
185   P  Baker, J F  Harris,  “Clinton neglected to sell “fast track” to U.S. Public”, The Washington 
Post, 12th November 1997, 20. 
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186 In general, Democrats in the House of Representatives were agreeing with the 
argument put forward by the House Minority leader Richard Gephart that the fast - 
track policy ties Congress’ hands when it comes to ensuring that other countries are 
following acceptable labour and environmental standards.  As a result, they contended 
that fast - track would give a competitive advantage to countries with low wage 
workers and government controlled salaries and work rules.  Indeed, according to 
Representative Kilpatrick from Detriot, “I am concerned Fast - track would eliminate 
the power of Congress to make amendments to trade agreements that would affect the 
people we are elected to serve.” 187   
 
Thus the fiercest obstacle Clinton faced in trying to gain support for a fast track 
authority was a growing popular disillusionment with NAFTA.  According to the head 
of AFL - CIO John Sweeney, America’s largest labour federation, there were a number 
of members of Congress who voted for NAFTA but had not seen what they were 
promised by the administration. 188 NAFTA critics point out the extremely high trade 
deficits that the U.S. suffered as a consequence of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement.  According to political commentator Jim Lobe, and using figures from the 
U.S. Commerce Department, he estimates that approximately 600 000 jobs were lost 
in the U.S. during 1996 as a consequence of NAFTA. 189 Moreover, according to 
Robert Scott, an analyst at the Economic Policy Institute, many of those jobs were 
186   M Eversley, “Michigan Congressmen line up against Fast - Track for Trade Agreements”, Knight 
- Ridder Tribune News Service, 6th October 1997, 1. 
187 Ibid, 2. 
188  D Hess, M Recio, “ClintonVows Fast Track ‘not dead’”, Knight - Ridder Tribune News Service, 
10th November 1997, 4. 
189   J Lobe, “Clinton Faces Uphill Battle for Fast Track Approval”, U S Trade, 4th December 1997, 1. 
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higher - paying positions in the automobile and other manufacturing industries.  In 
addition, he stressed that NAFTA is contributing to widening the gap between rich and 
poor in the United States. 190  
 
Anti-NAFTA sentiment was also fuelled by negative news coverage about Mexican 
corruption and drug trafficking, as well as the incident in early April 1997 with the 
Mexican strawberries.  Such stories dealt a “harsh blow to NAFTA expansion and the 
Clinton administration’s task of enlarging free trade in Latin America.” 191   
 
In considering the fast - track proposal a number of Congressmen were also 
uncomfortable voting for fast - track as it was asking Congress to give up some of its 
national power and would further the role of the World Trade Organisation as a body 
with more authority over American concerns than the U.S. government and thus 
unelected and unaccountable trade experts would be given the authority to overrule 
U.S. national state and local laws.  Therefore, having an effect on issues such as job 
creation legislation, consumer health and safety protections and environmental 
protections.  For example, two Congress members who stated that they opposed fast - 
track, - Congressman Kuccinich and Congressman LoBiondo both pointed out that a 
major disadvantage of the fast - track proposal was that several important state and 
federal laws were singled out by U.S. trade partners as infringements to trade, and as a 
result targeted for elimination. 192 Among these laws were small business set asides, 
190   Ibid, 3. 
191   P  Baker, J F  Harris,  “Clinton neglected to sell “fast track” to U.S. Public”, The Washington 
Post, 12th November 1997, 1. 
192   D Kucinich, “News Conference Announcing Bipartisan Coalition opposed to Fast Track Trade 
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health and safety standards, consumer protection such as nutrition labelling, and state 
bidding preferences for companies who invest back into the state.  Congressman 
Kucinich for instance, pointed out that if some protective measures such as the Barry 
Amendment which protected many Textile workers in his state by guaranteeing U.S. 
military orders for uniforms were repealed due to trade agreements made under a fast - 
track consideration that could potentially threaten the jobs of thousands of workers 
both in his State and nationally.193   
 
Another Congressman, Allen Boyd of Florida also pointed out some issues of concern 
in Congress in weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of approving the 
extension of fast - track. 194 One of the main concerns to Congressman Boyd was that 
if the president had fast - track authority and agreements like the Multi-lateral 
Agreement on investment were passed then various state laws could be challenged and 
overruled.  These could include laws such as those regarding land use, community 
reinvestment rules, and state established business licenses. 195 For example, Boyd 
mentioned some laws which an agreement on investment could overturn such as 
statutes in Virginia and Pennsylvania designed to protect the Chesapeke Bay.196  While 
Authority” Washington Transcript Service, 22nd October  1997, 1. 
193   Ibid. 
194   Ibid, 7. 
195   Ibid. 
196   Ibid.   
The Chesapeke Bay is the oldest estuary in the U.S. it is approximately 200 miles long and 150 rivers 
and streams drain into the river.  The Chesapeke Bay program is a regional partnership that has 
directed and conducted the restoration of the Chesapeke Bay and it living resources such as fin fish, 
shell fish, bay grasses and other aquatic life since 1983.  The partnership is led by a Executive 
Council which includes the governors of Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania and meets each year to 
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the  U.S. courts had given the states the power to restrict development and limit 
damage to the precious wetlands here, the consequence of a multi - lateral  investment 
agreement could see these powers overruled as an impediment to international 
investment.  Congressman Boyd highlighted several additional examples which could 
see state laws overruled or thrown out due to new international standards which could 
result under an agreement passed under fast - track.  Another one of these was the 
procurement preferences given for recycling done in Texas, California and Michigan 
which could be threatened as giving unfair advantages to factories located in the state. 
197   
 
At the same time, Clinton and his administration did successfully gain support from a 
number of Congress members, though this was often a result of meeting their requests.  
For example, the Democratic Representative from North Dakota Earl Pomeroy who 
was concerned over market access for North Dakota’s wheat and beef producers 
agreed to vote for fast -track after the administration promised to “respond forcefully” 
to Canadian pricing practices on durum wheat that unfairly disrupt the market for U.S. 
farmers. 198 Overall though, opposition to fast - track trade authority was seen by many 
members as payback for NAFTA as there was not a lot of trust left for the Clinton 
establish the direction for the Bay program, and their authority could be threatened by NAFTA laws 
which supercede state agreements.  Source “Case study for the Chesapeke Bay” 
www.chesbay.state.va.us 
197   D Kucinich, “News Conference Announcing Bipartisan Coalition opposed to Fast Track Trade 
Authority” Washington Transcript Service, 22nd October 1997, 3. 
198   C Dougherty, “Tough Fight Seen for “Fast Track” trade” The Washington Post, 22nd September, 
2000, 3. 
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administration. 199 
 
Overall, the sway of constituency interests suggests that members of Congress were 
more willing during the late 1990s to vote against measures that would liberalise trade 
in line with the type of workers, income distribution patterns and industries 
predominant in their state. 200   
 
Public Opinion: 
The second source of opposition to Clinton’s proposal for fast track investigated is 
public opinion.  While the above discussion has illustrated how the public influenced 
the votes of Congress members via their impact at the local constituency level, the 
general public mood in the country is also important.  Here Clinton was also faced with 
difficulties.  For example, as polls from August 1997 indicated, only 44% of the public 
favoured the fast - track proposal whereas 52% opposed it.  Moreover, as the 
Washington Post reported at the time, the debate over fast -track trade authority 
scarcely engaged the general public at all.  Even Clinton’s statement on 10th November 
which announced that due to the lack of support the fast track vote would be 
199   Further, according to Baldwin and Magee’s study, the 1998 fast - track vote also reflected a 
concern by legislators about the adverse effects of further trade liberalisation on less- educated groups 
than during the NAFTA vote.  Indeed, the in - depth study produced by Baldwin and Magee on the 
voting patterns of Congress members during this period, indicated that variables such as having ‘no 
high school diploma’ and unionisation tended to result in representatives who had a high proportion 
of these individuals in their districts to vote against the fast - track policy.  
R E Baldwin C S Magee, Congressional Trade Votes From Nafta Approval to Fast Track Defeat, 
Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C. 2000, 33.  
200   In this regard, concern for the potentially harmful economic effects of increasingly competitive 
trading competition was highest in districts with lower skilled and more vulnerable workers.   
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postponed until 1998 got only a little coverage on two of the three major American 
broadcast Network news shows, while the third channel - NBC - completely ignored 
the story.   
 
President Clinton also did not do very much to help sell and educate the public about 
the fast - track issue.  He only made two appearances outside Washington on the topic, 
and did little else to raise the profile or explain a policy which he maintained was 
critical to America’s standing in the world and negotiating new trade agreements.  As 
such, several official commentators maintained that the fast - track issue was not well 
understood by the public.  One such person was the U.S. trade representative from the 
first Bush administration, Carla Hills, who pointed out that Clinton did not talk about 
the benefits of trade.  She further contended that that would be necessary as the people 
who fear that their protected position will be in jeopardy usually have louder voices 
than the many who do not realise the benefits that they gain from. 201   
 
In addition, following an examination by administration officials after the fast - track 
vote into what had gone wrong in failing to get enough support, staff members 
concluded that one of the biggest problems was the fact that fast - track involved no 
specific country or industry and therefore had no natural allies with it.  While, by 
comparison, during the debate over NAFTA, and also China’s most favoured - nation 
trading status debate, companies and communities knew far more explicitly what they 
stood to gain with Mexico, Canada and China. 202  
201 R Farnier, “Fast Track Trade” The Columbian, 10th September, 1997, 1.   
202   P  Baker, J F  Harris,  “Clinton neglected to sell “fast track” to U.S. Public”, The Washington 
Post, 12th November, 1997, 12. 
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The role of domestic and interest groups: 
With regard to the influence of domestic groups and interest groups on the fast - track 
vote, the most significant groups making an influence were labour unions and 
environmental groups.  Both groups argued that fast - track would result in U.S. jobs 
being lost, food safety standards being lowered and environmental damage which could 
come about if U.S. companies opened factories and plants and invested in poorer 
countries to take advantage of weak labour and environmental laws. 203  
 
For example, Congressman Bonior stressed during a statement he made in Congress 
against approving fast - track that in Texas, factories paying workers $6 an hour have 
closed and moved to Mexico where they could hire labour for 10 times less.  He went 
on to state that it would seem ludicrous to expand a policy that already has such large 
failings. 204 Another example he cited was that of a Mexican worker called Rosa Maria 
Gonzalez whom he visited, and who worked in a top class modern factory making 
circuit boards, yet lives in a cardboard shack next to a sewage canal.  She only earnt 59 
cents an hour, which was not even enough to buy milk for her family.  According to 
Bonior, the industrial area where she worked housed some of the top businesses in the 
world, such as Ford, General Motors and General Electric.  At the same time however, 
her cardboard make - shift home highlights the unfulfilled promises of NAFTA - lower 
203 For example, head of the AFL - CIO Labour group, John Sweeny, said he wanted to write new 
legislation “that includes protection for people as well as property… and that incorporates workers’ 
rights and environmental standards.” See D Hess, M Recio, “ClintonVows Fast Track ‘not dead’”, 
Knight - Ridder Tribune News Service, 10th November, 1997.  
204   D Bonior, “News Conference with Senator Dorgan and Rep Bonior, Fast Track Trade Authority,” 
Washington Transcript Service, 24th October 1997, 11. 
Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)
       117 
wages, a dirtier environment and not much in the way of benefits for anyone except the 
economic elites.   
 
Thus, for Bonior and others opposing fast -  track, if America wants other countries to 
buy its goods, then trade agreements with the U.S. must contain basic labour rights 
that pay people more than 59 cents an hour.  Further, for the U.S. to be confident 
when shopping for groceries without being in fear of catching Hepatitis or ingesting 
DDT, trade agreements with the U.S. must address food safety. 205  
 
These points were further put to the Clinton administration by the heavy campaigning 
of labour groups.  In one instance nearly 2000 members of the Steelworkers union 
(USWA) rallied on the steps of the Capitol Building in Washington D.C. demanding 
that Congress defeat Republican efforts to force the measure through Congress before 
adjournment.  Many demonstrators waved signs and chanted “No more NAFTAs”.  
Becker called Fast - track an “inherently unfair and anti - democratic process that is 
fatally flawed.  “This fight is a class struggle between Wall St and Main St,” he added.  
Another campaigner,  Jackie Sebans, who makes Bic pens in Milford, Conneticut, and 
was one of the 15 members of the USWA from her district who had come to 
Washington said she was fighting for the administration to “stop taking away our 
jobs.”  Similarly, Betty Allen who had travelled from Buffalo N.Y. was holding up a 
sign reading “North America’s Future Traded Away”.  As one of the 39 members of 
the USWA in Buffalo, N.Y.  Betty Allen summed up her reason for coming to 
205  Ibid, 12.  
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Washington in five words: “We gotta stop Fast Track.” 206   
 
Highlighting the sentiment of such campaigners, Baldwin and Magee’s study found 
that both labour groups and environmental groups were significant explanatory 
variables in the fast - track vote.  As mentioned earlier, according to Baldwin and 
Magee, in the NAFTA vote, the greater labour contributions were for a member of 
Congress the greater the probability that that representative opposed NAFTA, this was 
also the case with those opposing fast - track.207  Although they admit that the effect of 
labour groups would not have been large enough to change the outcome on the fast 
track bill, it does illustrate the effect and influence of such groups.   
 
 
The other major group which opposed the Clinton administration proposal for fast - 
track to be extended was the environmental lobby. 208 In the run up to the fast - track 
vote, the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) tried to build a consensus among other 
environmental groups to enter into a process of negotiating environmental demands 
with the Clinton administration in return for their support for fast - track negotiating 
206 M Eisenscher, “U S Green Groups reject NWF Plan to Negotiate Fast Track Demands” Inside U S 
Trade, Vol 1536, 5th September, 1997, 17. 
207 R E Baldwin C S Magee, Congressional Trade Votes From Nafta Approval to Fast Track Defeat, 
Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C. 2000, 33. 
208   As indications of U.S. inattention with regard to NAFTA they noted the absence of 
Environmental Protection Agency Administration Carol Browner at the last meeting of the 
environment side accords main policy - making body.  The Environmental lobby also criticised the 
slow pace of the new NAFTA -related border institutions, the Border Environment Cooperation 
Council (BECC) and the NAD Bank in approving border clean up projects.  
M Eisenscher, “U S Green Groups reject NWF Plan to Negotiate Fast Track Demands” Inside U S 
Trade, Vol 1536, 5th September, 1997, 17. 
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authority. 209 Under a proposal advanced by the National Wildlife Federation, not all 
environmental demands would have had to be addressed in the fast - track legislation, 
and instead could have been satisfied in part by other Administration actions.  The 
other environmental groups however, told the National Wildlife Federation during a 2nd 
Sept 1997 phone conference that they would not join in making specific environmental 
demands on the Administration because they did not trust it to deliver on its promises 
unless they were included in the fast - track bill itself. 210  
 
Several other groups which joined NWF in backing NAFTA in 1993 were now intent 
on joining anti - NAFTA environmental forces in opposing fast - track if, as they 
expected, the administration declined to place environmental objectives in the fast - 
track legislation.   
 
Thus, it is clear from the above discussion that several of the major environmental 
groups set  tough standards for the administration to meet on fast - track.  Among the 
demands made was a call for incorporating a “formal green trade negotiating objective 
which signals the pro - environment trade policies are indeed a must.” 211  The  
environmental groups stated that they would not sway from their stance that the 
administration seek commitments inside a fast - track bill  to advance environmental 
protection.  If the administration pushed for a fast - track that did not meet up with the 
Environmental groups standards then all of the U.S. environmental groups, including 
several former NAFTA backers such as the Defenders of Wildlife, World Wildlife Fund 
209 Ibid, 19.  
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid.   
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and National Audubon Society, would act to try to defeat fast - track.  According to 
environmental sources, this would send the Administration a message that its failure to 
pro - actively implement a trade agenda sensitive to environmental concerns is 
untenable. 212 As such, the final vote of the fast - track trade proposal was opposed by 
every major environmental organisation.   
 
In conclusion, to have the fast - track authority successfully re - instated Clinton 
needed 218 “yes” votes in the House of Representative, which has a total of 435 seats.  
Clinton had already been promised the votes of 165 of the 228 Republican members, 
and needed 55 of the 206 Democrats vote to ensure the fast - track would pass.  
Unfortunately, Clinton fell about 10 votes short of his target, and could not get the 
necessary votes to pass the bill.  As a result, Clinton withdrew the bill and those 
opposing him considered themselves to have secured victory. 213 By refusing to give 
the president a blank cheque to negotiate international trade agreements, the House of 
Representatives lived up to its role as the people’s chamber in Congress.  Thus, this 
case again illustrates the power and influence of domestic groups and opinion on U.S. 
foreign policy during the period under study here.  A power that seems far more 
formidable than during other periods of U.S. foreign policy.   
 
 
 
 
212 Ibid, 17. 
213   J Lobe, “Clinton to Try Again on Fast Track”, Inter Press Service English News Wire, 11th 
November 1997, 1. 
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7.  Conclusion 
 
 
In conclusion, this study set out to investigate the public reaction to the expansion of 
NAFTA between 1993 - 1998 and to test the hypothesis that domestic concerns had 
more affect on foreign policy in the 1990s than during the Cold War.  By giving 
consideration to various theories and previous work on the topic of American foreign 
policy, we learned that there is a large amount of trends that make the period of 1993 - 
1998 distinct from both previous and subsequent periods of American foreign policy.  
That is to say, it was illustrated that changes in the international and domestic political 
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environment gave rise to a greater role for domestic groups, public opinion, and the 
Congress on foreign policy.  For example, whereas during the Cold War the country 
and government were rallied together against their commonly perceived enemy, when 
this threat was gone, more varied voices had something to say about how U.S. efforts 
abroad would be best involved.   
 
For example, while some continued to emphasise security, a large amount now 
emphasised the economy.  One consistent element in this period though, was that all 
constituencies whether they were regular citizens, congressmen or interest groups were 
likely to have a greater opportunity to be heard and air their views due to the end of 
the anti-communist foreign policy stance.  Indeed, the findings in this study illustrate 
that Congress indeed became more involved in foreign policy in the 1990s.  This stands 
in opposition to earlier stages in U.S. history where the U.S. Congress merely followed 
the executive branch on foreign policy.   
 
In fact, at the start of this study it was shown that there was a period during the 1950s 
- 1960s when it looked like there was the emergence of what Arthur Schlesinger 
termed an “imperial presidency,”  when the executive branch took a greater say in 
foreign policy than had even been granted by the Constitution.  This was not to say 
that Congress did not become involved during this time, but rather that it operated on 
the margins of policy and followed the executive branch a lot of the time.  As the 
evidence presented here showed however, there was a definite increase in 
Congressional activism after the Vietnam War shattered the foreign policy consensus.  
This was increased to an even greater extent after the end of the Cold War as 
illustrated in chapter 2 here.   
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Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the increased involvement of Congress on foreign 
policy after the Cold War was also accompanied by the increased involvement of other 
U.S. domestic groups in this realm.  This was illustrated in the case of NAFTA and the 
NAFTA expansion proposal, with activism by constituents, labour and environmental 
groups highlighted in this study.  Other examples abound to show activism in foreign 
affairs, such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), which has a 
network of more than 1400 groups in over 90 countries that work locally, nationally 
and internationally, to garner support for the eradication of anti - personnel land mines.  
This has included lobbying the U.S. government, and from time to time, ICBL 
ambassadors testify before the Congress.  One ambassador, Jesus Martinez for 
example, testified before the U.S. Congress on the need for victim assistance in post- 
conflict countries, and some other of his fellow ambassadors provide members of 
Congress with information sheets that helped to mold their views. 214  Thus, U.S. 
foreign policy in the period between 1994 - 1997 was subject to much more influence 
by a wide spectrum of groups such as business, environmental and ethnic groups and 
other pressures from the public, constituency groups and the media seeking to 
influence foreign policy.   
 
This study has also shown that in the post - Cold War era, economics became the 
priority issue for Americans and that new issues emerged that were global and affected 
all nations.  These issues included things like trade and the environment, and were of 
214 See www.analyst-network.com, and   www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl, for Jesus Martinez’s speech to 
Congress. 
Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)
       124 
greater concern with the increasing number of players in U.S. foreign policy reflecting 
this.  For example, the intermestic issues described in Chapter two which crossed 
borders and were global, also contributed to the increasing number of players 
becoming involved in the U.S. foreign policy arena, as mentioned above.  It was also 
highlighted in this study how there had indeed been a shift to more focus on economic 
well- being in the post - Cold War era with the illustration of the large gap in 
employment in California where the defence industries dramatically cut back the 
number of people it employed.  All this fed into fears for jobs and job security.   
 
It was also noted how the role of the media was different in the period between 1993 -
1998.  The main difference being like that of the public and other domestic factors, the 
media while by no means determining foreign policy is an influential factor.  It was also 
noted that importantly in the period studied here the media has benefited from 
technological changes and advances which have changed the way the government can 
operate and make policy.  This makes it less likely that they are able to make decisions 
that are not subject to some media scrutiny, yet the power of making decisions does 
remain with government officials.  Some of the influence which the media was 
illustrated as having was, the power to bring the public’s views to the government’s 
attention, at times to highlight issues and put them on the foreign policy agenda - such 
as through pictures of famine or disaster victims, and its role in scrutinising 
government responses.   
 
The final important trend noted was how the previous literature on public opinion and 
foreign policy was not applicable to the sensible views and opinions that the public 
have on foreign policy, and how their views were relevant to which policies were 
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pursued through their influence on members of Congress.  It was shown that while 
public and congressional opinion did not fully determine policy by any means, it tended 
to set parameters of the possible.  In the fast track episode in 1997 they were able to 
wield an effective veto, partly because foreign trade under the constitution gives the 
Congress primary responsibility in this area, and partly due to the more involved role it 
came to play in this period.   
 
Indeed, on both of the cases examined here, the NAFTA legislation passed in 1993, 
and the proposed expansion to NAFTA in 1997/1998, we found that the public, 
Congress and other domestic players made a marked impact on the outcome of these 
policies.  For example, on the NAFTA legislation, the Clinton administration had to 
adjust the treaty to meet conditions that were often a response to members of 
Congress’ concerns about industries in their district that might feel repercussions from 
the agreement.  This was illustrated by a number of examples such as that of 
negotiating the “rules of origin” that established how much of a good needed to be 
made in North America for it to be considered “North American.”  The “Big Three” 
auto makers in America - Ford, Chrystler and General Motors all had a fairly large 
interest in a high rule of origin to make it more difficult for Japanese and European car 
makers located in Canada to ship finished cars to the U.S. duty free.  Hence, the U.S. 
negotiators duly strove for high percentage to govern in rules of origin.    Thus, the 
rule of origin case showed how U.S. private industries could have an influence and 
impact the U.S. policy making process.   
 
In another case, the constituents in Florida and Louisiana whose livelihood depended 
on the farming and production of sugar, citrus fruits  and vegetables were important 
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factors of consideration for members of Congress for these states, and determining 
whether the negotiated terms were satisfactory enough for them to support NAFTA.  
As this study in fact pointed out, at the 1993 National Governors Associations Winter 
Meeting, fifty U.S. governors agreed to support NAFTA but only as long as 
“environmental concerns and job security were addressed.” 215  Which they were 
through Clinton’s side deals.   
 
Yet, on the case of the proposal for the expansion of NAFTA, the influence of public 
opinion and domestic constituencies was strong enough that it resulted in the Clinton 
administration not being able to get the fast - track it needed to pursue expansion of 
NAFTA.  In this case it was illustrated how the public’s general ambivalence about the 
expansion, largely because of disappointment with the original NAFTA prevented 
Clinton from securing the required votes in Congress to carry out his expansion plan.  
From this case and the other cases presented here we can get a better picture of the 
way groups interact to affect America’s foreign policy, and how in the period between 
1993 -1998 the trends suggest that a lot more accommodation and revisions were 
made to policies in order to reflect the views of players who had previously not held so 
much sway on America’s foreign policy.  Again, these cases pointed out the increased 
role and relevance of public opinion on American foreign policy making in between 
1993 - 1998.   
 
 
 
 
215 www.nga.org/portal/sit/nga. 
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